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abstract.  The low-level misdemeanor process is a powerful socio-legal institution that both 
regulates and generates inequality. At the same time, misdemeanor legal processing often ignores 
many foundational criminal justice values such as due process, evidence, and even individual guilt. 
These features are linked: the erosion of the rule of law is one of the concrete mechanisms enabling 
the misdemeanor system to take aim at the disadvantaged, rather than at the merely guilty. In the 
book Misdemeanorland, Issa Kohler-Hausmann describes the inegalitarian workings of the misde-
meanor legal process in New York City and how it operates as a system of managerial social control 
over the disadvantaged even when it stops short of convicting and incarcerating them. This Review 
summarizes the book’s key contributions to the burgeoning scholarly discourse on misdemeanors 
and then extends its insights about New York to illuminate the broader dynamics and democratic 
significance of the U.S. misdemeanor process. 
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introduction 
Over the past few years, misdemeanor policing and low-level courts have in-
creasingly become the subject of legal scrutiny, social unrest, and racial distrust. 
Across the country, civil rights advocates are suing municipal courts for operat-
ing as barely disguised regressive tax operations, in a system that the New York 
Times has labeled “cash-register justice.”
1
 Bail reform is sweeping the nation in 
large part because cash bail in low-level cases is increasingly understood as a 
form of unconstitutional discrimination against the poor. The anger of the Black 
Lives Matter movement is heavily fueled by the experience of order-maintenance 
policing—stops and arrests for minor offenses such as loitering, trespassing, and 
disorderly conduct.
2
 Michael Brown, after all, was originally stopped merely for 
jaywalking in the streets of Ferguson before police officer Darren Wilson shot 
and killed him.
3
 And in 2015, the Republican-controlled Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee held a hearing entitled “Protecting the Constitutional Right to Counsel 
for Indigents Charged with Misdemeanors,” in which committee chair Senator 
Chuck Grassley lamented that 
many states are not providing counsel as the Constitution requires. It is 
a widespread problem. In reality, the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment 
decisions regarding misdemeanor defendants are violated thousands of 
times every day. No Supreme Court decisions in our history have been 




1. Editorial, Ending Cash-Register Justice, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/10/17/opinion/ending-cash-register-justice.html [https://perma.cc/7YNH-A5V8]. 
2. End Broken Windows Policing, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org 
/brokenwindows [https://perma.cc/ZSM9-82U4] (arguing for the elimination or depriori-
tization of offenses including “Consumption of Alcohol on Streets, Marijuana Possession, 
Disorderly Conduct, Trespassing, Loitering, Disturbing the Peace [including Loud Music], 
Spitting, Jaywalking, [and] Bicycling on the Sidewalk”); see also Devon W. Carbado, Predatory 
Policing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 549-51 (2017) (identifying low-level misdemeanor policing as 
a source of systemic racism). 
3. Frances Robles & Julie Bosman, Autopsy Shows Michael Brown Was Struck at Least 6 Times, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/us/michael-brown 
-autopsy-shows-he-was-shot-at-least-6-times.html [https://perma.cc/YBR7-MMGK]. 
4. Protecting the Constitutional Right to Counsel for Indigents Charged with Misdemeanors: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter Grassley Statement]; see also Andrew Co-
hen, A New Conservative Approach to Justice: Serve the Poor, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/12/a-new-conservative-approach-to-justice 
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The stakes of this debate could not be higher. Misdemeanors represent 
eighty percent of state criminal dockets.
5
 Approximately thirteen million misde-
meanor cases are filed nationally every year, compared to three or four million 
felony cases.
6
 The misdemeanor process is the governance vehicle through which 
the U.S. penal system most frequently exercises its coercive police and punitive 
powers, usually over the most economically and racially vulnerable subjects. This 
is how the criminal system engages with most people, most of the time. Yet it 
does so in ways that are profoundly attenuated from the basic procedural re-
quirements and substantive justifications of criminal law. Light on due process, 
heavy on informal controls, and relatively uninterested in evidence or culpability, 
the petty-offense process does the work of criminal justice in violation of key 
rules governing the exercise of state criminal authority. 
There are numerous disturbing features of this phenomenon—it criminalizes 
the poor, convicts the innocent, and often violates the Constitution. But the 
foundational questions run deeper. The misdemeanor process sits on a demo-
cratic fault line of the criminal system as a thinly regulated exercise of police 
power that persistently resists many basic legitimating constraints of state penal 
authority and constitutional democracy. It is aggressively stratifying, aimed dis-
proportionately at the poor and people of color while contributing heavily to 
wealth-based and racial inequality. Enormous, decentralized, and opaque, the 
misdemeanor process is at once highly influential and lacking in democratic ac-
countability. 
For decades, the legal academy paid scant attention to this vast arena of law, 
policy, and practice. But that has recently changed. In 2018, two full-length 
books on the subject were released,
7
 the first since Malcolm Feeley published his 
 
-serve-the-poor [https://perma.cc/6BK2-QF4T] (contextualizing the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee hearing within broader conservative support for devoting more resources to appointed 
counsel in misdemeanor cases). 
5. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR 
SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 40-41 (2018). 
6. Id.  
7. ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN 
AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018); NATAPOFF, supra note 5. 
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seminal work, The Process Is the Punishment in 1979.
8
 Also in 2018, Boston Uni-
versity held a two-day symposium
9
 that generated nine articles on “the Misde-
meanor Machinery,”
10
 while at least four additional law review articles explored 
important aspects of the petty-offense process.
11
 The year before, in 2017, schol-
ars published over fifteen more pieces.
12
 Subjects ranged from cash bail to 
debtor’s prison to wrongful convictions. 
 
8. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIM-
INAL COURT (paperback ed. 1992). 
9. Misdemeanor Machinery: The Hidden Heart of the American Criminal Justice System, B.U. SCH. 
L., https://www.bu.edu/law/2017/09/15/misdemeanor-machinery-the-hidden-core-of-the 
-american-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/K8SH-N887]. 
10. Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 837 (2018); 
Greg Berman & Julian Adler, Toward Misdemeanor Justice: Lessons from New York City, 98 B.U. 
L. REV. 981 (2018); Jenn Rolnick Borchetta, Curbing Collateral Punishment in the Big Data Age: 
How Lawyers and Advocates Can Use Criminal Record Sealing Statutes to Protect Privacy and the 
Presumption of Innocence, 98 B.U. L. REV. 915 (2018); Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think About 
Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. REV. 673 (2018); Samuel R. Gross, Errors in Misdemeanor 
Adjudication, 98 B.U. L. REV. 999 (2018); Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor 
Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953 (2018); Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, The Prosecutor’s Client Problem, 
98 B.U. L. REV. 885 (2018); Jenny Roberts, The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors, 98 B.U. 
L. REV. 779 (2018); Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 
B.U. L. REV. 731 (2018). 
11. Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187 
(2018); Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 2 (2018) (arguing that common forms of economic sanction constitute fines 
for the purpose of the Eighth Amendment); Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 
DUKE L.J. 1381, 1381 (2018) (asserting “that the reach of the criminal justice system is not just 
the product of overly punitive laws, but also the product of institutions capitalizing on crim-
inal law decisions for their own ends”); Zina Makar, Displacing Due Process, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 
425, 425 (2018) (arguing that “procedural protections have been unjustly reserved for the trial 
stage based on the unrealistic assumption that a trial will be guaranteed”); see also Carlos 
Berdejó, Gender Disparities in Plea Bargaining, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2019). 
12. Brandon Buskey & Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Keeping Gideon’s Promise: Using Equal Protection to 
Address the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299 (2017); Paul 
Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 
711 (2017); Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738 
(2017); Alexandra Natapoff, A Stop Is Just a Stop: Terry’s Formalism, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
113 (2017); Henry Ordower et al., Out of Ferguson: Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts, Tax Dis-
tribution, and Constitutional Limitations, 61 HOW. L.J. 113 (2017); Jenny Roberts, Informed Mis-
demeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171 (2017); Jessica A. Roth, The Culture of Misde-
meanor Courts, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215 (2017); Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. 
L. REV. 585 (2017); Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399 
(2017). A 2017 symposium at Hofstra published a total of ten misdemeanor-related articles. 
Symposium, Judicial Responsibility for Justice in Criminal Courts, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (2017). 
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This cornucopia of new scholarship represents the initiation of a long over-
due project: a rigorous, academy-wide evaluation of the largest component of 
the modern U.S. criminal system.
13
 It is a component that has been intellectually 
overshadowed by the excesses of its felony counterpart; the legal academy has 
spent decades unpacking the theoretical challenges and programmatic weak-
nesses of mass incarceration. Finally, misdemeanors are getting their due. 
Issa Kohler-Hausmann makes an important contribution to this burgeoning 
discourse in her book Misdemeanorland: Criminal Courts and Social Control in an 
Age of Broken Windows Policing. The book is a deep sociological dive into the 
workings of New York City’s lower court system, which processes hundreds of 
thousands of misdemeanor cases every year. Kohler-Hausmann uses the advent 
of broken-windows policing in New York in the 1990s and the explosion of mi-
nor arrests that it generated to explore how that court system responded to the 
massive influx of cases. From 1980 to 2010, annual misdemeanor arrests in New 
York nearly quadrupled from 65,000 to 251,000.
14
 Through detailed analysis of 
the routine charging, processing, and sentencing decisions made in New York 
courts between approximately 2000 and 2015, Kohler-Hausmann offers a nu-
anced view of misdemeanor punishment, finding that it is just as concerned with 
imposing criminal record “marks” and informal social controls as it is aimed at 
producing legal convictions and formal sentences. She calls this phenomenon 
“managerial justice,” in which prosecutors and judges 
seek social control by sorting and testing defendants into the future by 
building records on their law enforcement contacts, evaluating their rule-
abiding propensities through measured compliance with a series of pro-
cedural requirements, and gradually ratcheting up the punitive response 
 
13. I have argued for this kind of sustained attention to misdemeanors since 2012. Alexandra Na-
tapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors]; see 
also, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 
71, 71-92 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) [hereinafter Natapoff, The Penal 
Pyramid] (theorizing the erosion of rule of law at the bottom of the penal pyramid, where 
offenses are pettiest); Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1043 (2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors] (discussing 
the erosion of the individual-fault model in misdemeanor processing); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049 (2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Gideon Skep-
ticism] (discussing structural barriers to effective misdemeanor representation); Alexandra 
Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants and the Criminalization of Poverty, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 445 
(2015) [hereinafter Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants] (discussing the welfarization of crime around 
petty offenses); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055 
(2015) (discussing the inegalitarian effects of decriminalization). 
14. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 42; see also id. at 124 (noting that between 115,000 and 
200,000 subfelony cases are resolved annually at arraignment). 
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Kohler-Hausmann contrasts managerial justice with what she terms the “ad-
judicative model,” a more conventionally legalistic framework “concerned with 
deciding guilt and punishment in specific cases.”
16
 Unlike the adjudicative 
model, managerial justice is not particularly interested in evidence or guilt, but 
rather in exercising social control through “marking,” “procedural hassle,” and 
“performance.”
17
 As described by the book, these three practices are the primary 
tools through which New York legal officials track, evaluate, and control the peo-
ple who pass through “misdemeanorland.” These practices involve marking and 
tracking defendants by creating detailed criminal records and imposing demean-
ing experiences and onerous performances on them that the system then uses to 
evaluate defendants’ general rule-abiding character. Managerial justice still pun-
ishes, but it often postpones or forgoes incarceration and conviction in exchange 
for these lighter, less formal intrusions.
18
 At bottom, managerial justice is based 
on a “presumption of need for social control over the people who are brought 
from” disorderly communities into the criminal system,
19
 who in turn are largely 
poor people of color.
20
 The book’s primary claim is that managerial justice, with 
its presumptive need for social control and its lighter punitive touch, has largely 
displaced the adjudicative model in New York City.
21
 
The book builds upon a number of intellectual traditions. It is a welcome 
addition to the collateral-consequences literature, which has long noted that 
 
15. Id. at 5. 
16. Id. at 4; see also id. at 61 (defining the adjudicative model as one in which “the role of court 
actors is to adjudicate the factual guilt or innocence of a defendant in a particular case”); id. 
at 72 (further describing the adjudicative model). 
17. Id. at 5. 
18. Id. at 199 (describing criminal justice actors as willing to accept managerial justice “in lieu of 
formal punishment”); id. at 74 (asserting that managerial practices “illustrate a [prosecuto-
rial] sentiment that it is morally unnecessary for the heavy machinery of criminal justice to 
come down on every defendant accused of a low-level offense if the person can prove himself 
to be responsible and governable”); id. at 266 (“The moral principle at work in the managerial 
model [is] that we essentially don’t seek any punishment at all unless the person demonstrates 
a persistent disregard for social rules and otherwise seems unmoored from other institutions 
of social control . . . .”). 
19. Id. at 53; see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 611, 627 (2014) (“[The managerial model] operates on the basis of a presumption of 
need for social control over the population brought into misdemeanor court.”). 
20. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 51-53. 
21. Id. at 4 (claiming that misdemeanor courts in New York City “have largely abandoned” the 
adjudicative model); id. at 10 (same). 
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convictions and formal penalties are not the only punitive experience—and for 
misdemeanors, not even the central punitive experience—visited upon people 
who pass through the criminal process. As various scholars have explained, “mis-
demeanor prosecutions and convictions ha[ve] negative effects that reach far be-
yond the confines of the criminal courthouse” and “non-criminal sanctions . . . 
often overwhelm any sentence that the trial judge imposes.”
22
 Negative effects 
may include the loss of immigration status, housing, public benefits, driver’s li-
censes, credit, and social status.
23
 The punitive experience can begin as early as 
the initial arrest, which serves not only as an exercise of criminal police power 
but as “a regulatory tool—a means of monitoring, ordering, and tracking indi-
viduals. The aim of this type of [arrest-based] regulation can be quite distinct 
from certain criminal law concerns—adjudicating guilt or innocence, maintain-
ing law and order, deterring crime, and meting out punishment.”
24
 Misdemean-
orland’s thick descriptions of the mechanics of social control advance this bur-
geoning misdemeanor literature and deepen our understanding of the many 
dimensions of the low-level criminal justice encounter. 
Misdemeanorland also dovetails with scholarship regarding the criminalizing 
control exerted by poverty-oriented public institutions such as welfare offices, 
housing courts, and hospital emergency rooms—the so-called “criminalization 
of poverty.”
25
 Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward observed long ago that a 
central function of public welfare is the “regulation of marginal labor and . . . the 
maintenance of civil order.”
26
 Nearly forty years later, Loïc Wacquant argued that 
this welfarist social-control function has been largely taken over by the criminal 
system, representing “the gradual replacement of a (semi-) welfare state by a 
police and penal state for which the criminalization of marginality and the puni-
tive containment of dispossessed categories serve as social policy at the lower end 
 
22. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal 
Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 288, 364 (2011). 
23. Id. at 371; see also NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 19-38 (describing the far-reaching impact of mis-
demeanor encounters); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs 
of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 300-07 (2009) 
(describing the punitive impact of encounters with the New York misdemeanor system). 
24. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 815 (2015); see Anna Roberts, Arrests as 
Guilt, 60 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
25. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 224 (comparing the misdemeanor process to welfare of-
fices); see Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants, supra note 13, at 450-53 (describing resonances between 
the welfare state and the petty-offense process). 
26. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF 
PUBLIC WELFARE 371 (2d Vintage ed. 1993) (1971). 
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of the class and ethnic order.”
27
 This takeover is exemplified by the criminaliza-
tion of welfare,
28
 health care, and homelessness. In his study of emergency-room 
practices in large urban hospitals, for example, Armando Lara-Millán describes 
how nurses allocate medical resources based on patients’ perceived criminality, 
and concludes “that the urban poor’s access to health care is mediated . . . by in-
carceration, policing, and crime control language.”
29
 On Los Angeles’s enormous 
Skid Row, police route the homeless into shelters under the threat of arrest.
30
 As 
Misdemeanorland illustrates in detail, the petty-offense process is an active mem-
ber of this interrelated family of controlling institutions. 
Perhaps most obviously, Misdemeanorland is part of a long tradition in soci-
ology—Kohler-Hausmann is a sociologist—that understands lower courts pri-
marily as institutions of social rather than legal control. In 1956, Caleb Foote 
described the vagrancy courts of Philadelphia as devoted to poverty manage-
ment: 
Philadelphia magistrates . . . viewed their function as a deterrent one to 
banish “bums” from Philadelphia and keep them out (“After this you 
stay where you belong”), or as a form of civic sanitation (“I’ll clean up 
this district if I have to stay here until 5 o’clock every afternoon”), or as 
control of suspicious persons (“There have been a lot of robberies around 
here. I’m going to have you investigated—three months”), or as human-
itarian (“I’m saving his life by sending him where he can’t booze”).
31
 
Twenty years later, Malcolm Feeley wrote that “criminal courts everywhere are 
populated by the poor and the disadvantaged and the problems that bring them 
 
27. LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECU-
RITY 41 (2009); see also ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON 
CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016) (describing how the wel-
fare programs of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society morphed into the criminal justice apparatus 
of mass incarceration). 
28. KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION 
OF POVERTY 51-68 (2011). 
29. Armando Lara-Millán, Public Emergency Room Overcrowding in the Era of Mass Imprisonment, 
79 AM. SOC. REV. 866, 880 (2014); see also Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1657, 1676-77 (2008) (“[I]n exchange for prenatal treatment at government-
funded hospitals, pregnant women should assume that blood tests, urine samples, and other 
medical information will be divulged to police and prosecutors at the whim of doctors and 
nurses expressly for the purpose of punishing pregnant women for the ways in which they 
behave.”). 
30. FORREST STUART, DOWN, OUT, AND UNDER ARREST: POLICING AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN SKID 
ROW 4, 13, 81 (2016). 
31. Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 613 (1956). 
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into contact with the criminal courts do not vary radically. Indeed, the courts are 
one of society’s primary institutions for managing such people and their contin-
uing problems.”
32
 In 1985, John Irwin described the purpose of jail—a core mis-
demeanor institution—as “managing the underclass in American society.”
33
 
“[J]ail was invented,” he wrote, “and continues to be operated, in order to man-
age society’s rabble.”
34
 Misdemeanorland offers a rich, empirically sophisticated, 
updated version of these analyses, replete with multiyear cohort comparisons 
and aimed at one of the largest experiments in misdemeanor policing and pro-
cessing in U.S. history. 
This Review summarizes, contextualizes, and extends some of the many 
contributions of Misdemeanorland in light of the broad institutional and demo-
cratic challenges that petty-offense processing poses to the U.S. criminal justice 
enterprise writ large. Part I offers a national perspective by providing a brief 
overview of misdemeanor processing as practiced in thousands of jurisdictions 
around the country. It zeroes in on two key systemic features—the erosion of 
legal norms and the stratifying tendency to target poor people of color—and ar-
gues that these two features are intimately linked. Devaluing due process is one 
of the primary mechanisms through which the misdemeanor process creates and 
exacerbates social disadvantage. 
Part II then summarizes the main contribution of Misdemeanorland, its de-
tailed and provocative picture of New York City practices, and unpacks the 
book’s description and theory of managerial justice. In particular, it highlights 
the book’s nuanced depictions of the managerial mechanisms of social control 
and the various ways in which they advance our understandings of the misde-
meanor-punishment phenomenon. 
The Review then builds on the book’s offerings in a few different directions. 
First, in Part III, it unpacks the persistence in New York of conventional punish-
ments like incarceration and conviction in order to consider how managerialism 
sits along the broader spectrum of misdemeanor punitive practices. Although 
New York is atypical in many ways,
35
 analyzing its distinctive features opens up 
a potential comparative conversation about how other U.S. jurisdictions deploy 
their own mix of managerial and conventional punishments. 
Part IV excavates the transformative role played by defense counsel in New 
York. Misdemeanorland argues that New York has largely abandoned the adjudi-
 
32. FEELEY, supra note 8, at xxii. 
33. See JOHN IRWIN, THE JAIL: MANAGING THE UNDERCLASS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 9-10 (1985). 
34. Id. at 2. 
35. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 15 (describing New York City’s misdemeanor courts as 
“simultaneously interesting and atypical”). 
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cation of guilt and innocence, but the book also describes the persistently adver-
sarial quality of misdemeanor processing in ways that complicate that story. The 
adversarial process has a deep relationship to American adjudicative norms, and 
New York defense attorneys often behave like classic adjudicative actors—engag-
ing in zealous representation, fighting over facts, and litigating to the extent the 
system permits—with visible impact on case outcomes. At the same time, pros-
ecutors strongly resist dismissing cases, in effect validating the policing assump-
tions that generated those cases in the first place. This adversarial clash generates 
managerial compromises. Buried in Misdemeanorland is thus a potentially more 
adjudicative narrative about how New York public defenders structurally coun-
teract punitive prosecutorial defaults. It is a narrative with implications for the 
entire U.S. misdemeanor system, in which the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel is persistently underenforced in ways that account for some of its punitive-
ness. 
Lastly, in Part V, the Review returns to the linkages between due process and 
equality norms and articulates more thoroughly the normative damage done to 
principles of race and class equality when misdemeanor systems jettison com-
mitments to evidence, questions of actual guilt, due process, and other rule-of-
law values. Although Misdemeanorland criticizes the inegalitarian class and racial 
dynamics of the New York misdemeanor system, it does not explicitly resolve 
the normative question of how deeply managerial justice is to blame. Part V con-
siders the book’s various critical descriptions of managerialism and concludes 
that Misdemeanorland is best read as a demonstration that the dual managerial 
turn away from criminal guilt and toward social control is actively classist and 
racist. 
Misdemeanors sit in the shadow of mass incarceration and as a result are 
often mistakenly assumed to be lenient. Indeed, the excesses of mass incarcera-
tion have numbed us to the special brand of dehumanization that characterizes 
much misdemeanor processing. But Misdemeanorland implicitly destabilizes the 
leniency fallacy: the book shows how New York’s managerial approach remains 
disrespectful, burdensome, and punitive in its own ways. More broadly, the story 
of New York’s massive expansion of policing and prosecution under the aegis of 
broken windows is a cautionary tale about normative baselines. It reminds us to 
be skeptical whenever the state intentionally extends its criminalizing reach over 
many more individuals and then frames its treatment of those new subjects as 
“lenient” because it could have punished them more harshly. Such insights can 
help us appreciate more fully the punitive qualities of the entire U.S. misde-
meanor behemoth. 
the high stakes of low-level criminal justice 
1659 
i .  the misdemeanor challenge in national perspective:  
devaluing due process for the disadvantaged 
Because the U.S. misdemeanor landscape is enormous, diverse, and often 
opaque, no single description can do it full justice. There are thousands of low-
level courts across the country—including district courts, municipal courts, 
magistrate courts, summary courts, justice courts, and mayor’s courts. Each state 
handles them in its own fashion. Moreover, states vary widely in how much data 
they collect and publicize about their misdemeanor dockets, so national data is 
uneven in quality and availability. Some states, like New York, have unified sys-
tems in which all low-level courts report to the central Administrative Office of 
the Court (AOC), but at least ten states do not and therefore do not centrally 
track misdemeanor cases and convictions.
36
 For example, in 2015 when I asked 
Maine’s AOC for a breakdown of its misdemeanor caseload, the office told me 
that its computer system was too outdated to perform that kind of data analy-
sis.
37
 Nationally, about half of all state-court prosecutors report case resolutions 
to statewide criminal-record repositories, and only half of those prosecutors re-
port misdemeanor dispositions.
38
 Hundreds of municipal courts provide no 




These low-level courts perform all sorts of legal and social control work. 
They assess guilt and impose criminal convictions. They mark, track, evaluate, 
and punish. Some enforce spatial boundaries of segregation and gentrification, 
punishing people of color, drug addicts, or the homeless for entering areas in 
which businesses or residents do not want them.
40
 A subset of community, or 
 
36. See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 256-58 tbl.A.1 (listing ten states with nonunified court sys-
tems). 
37. Telephone Interview with “Laura” (no last name), Official, Me. Admin. Office of the Court 
(Dec. 16, 2016). 
38. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 205334, REPORTING BY PROSECU-
TORS’ OFFICES TO REPOSITORIES OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS (2005), https://bjs.gov 
/content/pub/pdf/rporchr.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJU9-3SPS] (“When prosecutors report 
final disposition information to repositories, half of them report misdemeanor convictions, 
misdemeanor acquittals, or indictments.”). 
39. NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 256-58 tbl.A.1 & nn.6, 8, 34, 37, 39, 41, 46, 54, 56 (documenting 
states that lack unified court systems and the extent to which their municipal courts report 
caseloads to the AOC). 
40. KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTROL IN URBAN 
AMERICA 85-92 (2009); Abdallah Fayyad, The Criminalization of Gentrifying Neighborhoods, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/the 
-criminalization-of-gentrifying-neighborhoods/548837/ [https://perma.cc/V6DU-XPTP]. 
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“specialty,” courts has adopted strong welfarist commitments, providing drug 
treatment, job training, and other rehabilitative benefits to discrete high-need 




Many courts are also raising money. The U.S. Department of Justice’s 2015 
investigation of the Ferguson Police Department exposed this revenue-generat-
ing aspect of the system, describing a criminal process in which “many officers 
appear to see some residents, especially those who live in Ferguson’s predomi-
nantly African American neighborhoods, less as constituents to be protected 
than as potential offenders and sources of revenue.”
42
 Sherwood, Arkansas has a 
once-a-week court session devoted to bounced-check cases. The court raises so 
much money in fines and fees for the city that the courthouse staff nicknamed it 
“Million Dollar Thursday.”
43
 By contrast, some municipal courts provide a rela-
tively small share of local budgets.
44
 
Notwithstanding this diversity, the national misdemeanor landscape exhib-
its two persistent, core characteristics from which its deepest normative chal-
lenges flow: its pervasive disregard for basic criminal law and procedural pro-
tections and its strong inegalitarian tendencies toward criminalizing and 
punishing the poor and people of color.
45
 Lower courts have long been known 
for their speed, informality, and inattention to due process and evidence. In 1979, 
Feeley described the “casualness and confusion” of New Haven’s lower court, 
where half of all defendants had no lawyer and “[a]rrestees were arraigned in 
groups and informed of their rights en masse . . . . While a few cases took up as 
much as a minute or two of the court’s time . . . the overwhelming majority of 
cases took just a few seconds.”
46
 Over thirty years later, a report entitled Three 
 
41. Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants, supra note 13, at 454-55 (describing various community courts 
and services). 
42. Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, U.S. DEP’T JUST.  2 (Mar. 4, 
2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03
/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K35Y-MFWL]. 
43. David Koon, “Million-Dollar Thursday”: A Visit to Sherwood’s Hot Check Court, ARK. TIMES: 
ARK. BLOG (Aug. 25, 2016, 2:40 PM), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives
/2016/08/25/million-dollar-thursday-a-visit-to-sherwoods-hot-check-court [https://perma
.cc/T8SB-ZSFF]. 
44. Mark Flatten, City Courts: Money, Pressure and Politics Make It Tough to Beat the Rap, GOLDWA-
TER INST. 9 (2017), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/City 
-Court-Policy-Paper-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/78G7-QQNX] (“Arizona cities . . . typically 
raise less than 5 percent of their general fund revenue through the courts.”). 
45. I have explored the stratifying erosion of rule of law within the misdemeanor process in detail. 
See Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, supra note 13, at 71-92. 
46. FEELEY, supra note 8, at 10-13. 
the high stakes of low-level criminal justice 
1661 
Minute Justice: Haste and Waste in Florida’s Misdemeanor Courts described the 
same speedy phenomenon: most proceedings lasted less than three minutes, and 
nearly seventy percent of defendants, two-thirds of whom did not have lawyers, 
pled guilty immediately at arraignment.
47
 A 2009 national report uncovered 
comparable practices all over the country.
48
 Defendants who cannot afford bail, 
who have overworked counsel, or who have no counsel at all are all under enor-
mous pressure to plead guilty right away. Prosecutors often withdraw favorable 
plea offers if they are not accepted immediately. Prosecutors, public defenders, 
and judges are themselves under pressure to clear large dockets, and a premium 
is placed on speed. 
To be sure, not all low-level courts are so rushed and informal. Some 
courts—for example, some nonimmigration federal misdemeanor dockets—look 
much like felony courts, with lawyers, hearings, trials, and appeals.
49
 But more 
often, misdemeanor courts are known for their size and lack of formal legal con-
straints. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in 1972, “[T]he volume of misde-
meanor cases, far greater in number than felony prosecutions, may create an ob-
session for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result.”
50
 At the 
extreme end of the spectrum, legal expertise may simply be absent. In some 
courts, there are no prosecutors: police handle their own cases from beginning 
to end, acting as prosecutor, witness, and negotiator.
51
 In some courts, the judges 
 
47. Alisa Smith & Sean Maddan, Three Minute Justice: Haste and Waste in Florida’s Misdemeanor 
Courts, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. 15, 22 (July 2011), https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea
/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=20794 [https://perma.cc/CQ5H-4ZMB]. 
48. Robert C. Boruchowitz et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Bro-
ken Misdemeanor Courts, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. (Apr. 2009), https://www
.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/misdemeanor_20090401.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MXG3-H9UN]. 
49. High-volume federal immigration dockets often permit speedy processing and mass guilty 
pleas in ways that strongly resemble the most informal misdemeanor courts. See, e.g., United 
States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding a mass immigration plea 
process under Operation Streamline); see also Joanna Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review 
of Operation Streamline, CHIEF JUST. EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY 
(Jan. 2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7GES-M457] (describing mass pleas of as many as eighty defendants at a 
time). I am indebted to Mona Lynch for this point. 
50. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972). 
51. Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop out of Copping a Plea: Eradicating Police Prosecution of Criminal 
Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305 (1998) (documenting fourteen states that permit police prosecu-
tions, including Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and 
Virginia); see also Diane DePietropaolo Price, Summary Injustice: A Look at Constitutional Defi-
ciencies in South Carolina’s Summary Courts, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. 19 (2016), https://




 Because so many low-level courts underenforce the right to 
counsel, sometimes there are no attorneys in these courtrooms at all.
53
 
This speedy, informal misdemeanor culture often openly disregards legal 
rules. For example, judges have been known to discipline defense attorneys who 
attempt to file motions or go to trial.
54
 Eve Brensike Primus, a former public 
defender, relates how a misdemeanor judge once invented an imaginary rule of 
evidence to help the prosecution. When she objected, he threatened to hold her 
in contempt.
55
 In Texas, many judges incorrectly maintained that they did not 
have to assess misdemeanor defendants’ ability to pay before incarcerating them 
over unpaid fines, even though Texas law expressly states that they must.
56
 In 
New York, Eddie Wise was arrested and convicted of loitering seven times after 
the New York loitering statute was held unconstitutional.
57
 
Because this legal indifference erodes the rule of law, it derogates the signif-
icance of guilt and criminal culpability—the foundational issues of fault that 
criminal law is designed to evaluate. The pressure to plead guilty quickly, with-
out attention to rules or evidence, reflects a cultural disregard for the individu-
ated evaluation of whether a particular person is guilty, culpable, and deserves 
to be punished. Sometimes this speed and pressure leads to wrongful convic-
tions; many misdemeanor defendants plead guilty to crimes of which they are 
 
www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=41216&libID=41186 [https://perma.cc
/UU9F-ZYEF] (noting that, with the exception of one county, “89% of defendants were pro-
cessed in courts without a single lawyer involved”). 
52. North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of lay judges in police 
court when a de novo trial is available later). 
53. Alisa Smith et al., Rush to Judgment: How South Carolina’s Summary Courts Fail to Protect Con-
stitutional Rights, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. 16 (2017), https://www.nacdl.org 
/RushToJudgement [https://perma.cc/D2VL-MTNM] (documenting police prosecutions in 
South Carolina summary courts). 
54. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 48, at 23 (describing the facts of Ohio v. Jones, Case No. 2008-
P-0018 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2008)); see also Richard A. Oppel Jr., His Clients Weren’t Com-
plaining. But the Judge Said This Lawyer Worked Too Hard., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/us/indigent-defense-lawyer-texas.html [https://
perma.cc/7Z6B-Q22Y] (describing a federal lawsuit alleging that a Texas judge retaliated 
against an appointed defense lawyer for “overwork[ing] cases” by requesting paid investiga-
tors and spending longer than three hours on clients who pled guilty). 
55. Eve Brensike Primus, Our Broken Misdemeanor Justice System: Its Problems and Some Potential 
Solutions, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 80, 81 (2012). 
56. Kendall Taggart & Alex Campbell, In Texas It’s a Crime to Be Poor, BUZZFEED (Oct. 7, 2017, 5:21 
PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/kendalltaggart/in-texas-its-a-crime-to-be-poor [https://
perma.cc/529Q-PBEN]. 
57. Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 85 & n.3 (2007). 




 But the normative erosion runs deeper: it is a basic 
abdication of the fault model at the bottom of the penal pyramid, where offenses 
are pettiest and defendants are poorest.
59
 In effect, the misdemeanor legal system 
has declared that it is not deeply concerned whether defendants have actually 
committed the crimes for which they have been arrested, as it will not meaning-
fully inquire into the question. 
This cavalier institutional attitude towards guilt and criminal culpability is 
largely, though not solely, deployed against the most socially vulnerable and stig-
matized populations: the poor, people of color, the homeless, and the addicted.
60
 
The idea of the “criminalization of poverty” partially captures this dynamic. 
Many misdemeanors are crimes of poverty in the first place, such as driving on 
a suspended license for failure to pay fines or sleeping or urinating in public due 
to homelessness. In addition, heavy street policing of low-income neighbor-
hoods makes it more likely that the poor will encounter the criminal process. The 
misdemeanor population is also heavily skewed by race and ethnicity, largely due 
to low-level policing practices. African Americans are four times more likely to 
be arrested for marijuana possession than whites even though blacks and whites 
use marijuana at the same rates.
61
 In Ferguson, Missouri, the Department of Jus-
tice found that over 90% of low-level citations and arrests were enforced against 
African Americans, who comprised only 67% of the population.
62
 Similarly, in 
Baltimore, African Americans comprise 63% of the population but between 80% 
and 90% of all arrests. In particular, Baltimore police rely heavily on order-
maintenance and drug-possession arrests which are especially racially skewed.
63
 
In Nebraska, African Americans make up only 5% of the population, but 19% of 
 
58. Alexandra Natapoff, Negotiating Accuracy: DNA in the Age of Plea Bargaining, in WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 
85, 94-96 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017). 
59. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 13, at 1317, 1366-68. 
60. NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 53-54 (documenting the disadvantaged status of much of the mis-
demeanor population). 
61. The War on Marijuana in Black and White, ACLU 4 (June 2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites
/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5TF 
-V35S]. 
62. Civil Rights Div., supra note 42, at 4 (concluding that the Ferguson Police Department “ap-
pears to bring certain offenses almost exclusively against African Americans”). 
63. Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 7-8, 55-
56 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [https://perma.cc/BU3V 
-AS6Y]. 




 Such disparities make the misdemeanor process a 
frontline contributor to the racialization of crime. 
These twin dysfunctions—the erosion of legal commitments and the active 
perpetuation of social inequality—are linked both conceptually and in practice. 
In theory, inattention to substantive criminal law makes room for the selection 
of defendants based on extralegal factors such as wealth and race. A system au-
thentically motivated to ferret out crime and guilt should, as it were, resist selec-
tion based on nonevidentiary social characteristics. At the same time, strong le-
gal norms generally make it more difficult and expensive to criminalize people.
65
 
Inattention to evidentiary and procedural constraints thus permits convictions 
that might not otherwise occur, which is a way of saying that weak legal norms 
contribute to the overcriminalization of the disadvantaged. In practice, the dis-
advantaged are the natural subjects of the petty-offense process. It dispropor-
tionately selects and convicts them, formally and permanently labeling them 
criminal in ways that, in turn, reinforce their social vulnerability. The misde-
meanor system, in other words, affirmatively generates social and racial stratifi-




These inequitable dynamics have inspired much of the recent groundswell 
of critical scholarship around misdemeanors.
67
 Which brings us to Misdemean-
orland and its meticulous description of New York. 
 
64. Neb. Admin. Office of the Courts, Defendant Characteristics by Race and Gender, Nebraska 
District and County Courts (unpublished report) (on file with author) (finding, in 2015, 
15,288 cases filed against black defendants out of 80,170 total cases documented); QuickFacts 
Nebraska, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ne
/RHI225217 [https://perma.cc/VY7V-2EEP] (listing Nebraska demographic data for African 
Americans). 
65. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
187, 190-91 (2017) (discussing the general lack of internalized costs in criminal decision-mak-
ing). 
66. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 13, at 1371-72; see also Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Mis-
demeanors, supra note 13, at 1045-46 (describing troubling features of the urban misdemeanor 
process). 
67. See supra notes 10-13. 
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i i .  new york city 
A. The Legal System’s Response to Broken-Windows Policing 
Misdemeanorland is about the impact of “broken-windows” policing on New 
York’s misdemeanor legal apparatus and culture. In the 1990s, New York City 
embarked on a massive investment in what is commonly known as “broken-win-
dows,” “order-maintenance,” or “quality-of-life” policing. Other major cities 
such as Los Angeles and Chicago, and a myriad of smaller jurisdictions, did the 
same.
68
 But the scale and spectacularly costly results of New York’s commitment 
made it the poster child for the experiment. As noted above, the surge in misde-
meanor arrests meant that New York’s misdemeanor courts went from pro-
cessing 65,000 misdemeanor arrests in 1980 to 251,000 in 2010.
69
 The largest 
categories of arrests were for drug possession, minor assault, turnstile jumping, 
larceny, and trespass.
70
 The practice remains heavily focused on low-income 
communities of color; in 2015, eighty-one percent of misdemeanor arrestees 
were African Americans or Latinos, although those groups comprise only about 
fifty-three percent of New York’s population.
71
 Broken-windows arrests ebbed 
after 2010 for a constellation of reasons, including successful civil rights litiga-




Broken-windows policing has generated an enormous controversy and liter-
ature. The underlying theory maintains that strictly enforcing low-level offenses 
will reduce more serious crime up the food chain, a claim that remains empiri-
cally unverified and hotly contested.
73
 At the same time, heavy misdemeanor en-
forcement in low-income communities of color has been widely decried as racist, 
ineffective, and costly. As Bernard Harcourt put it, 
 
68. See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City 
and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272 (2006). 
69. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 42. 
70. Id. at 107-08. 
71. Id. at 51; QuickFacts New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2018), https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork [https://perma.cc/83XB-YDJ4]; see also 
KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 53 (“[M]isdemeanor arrests have been overwhelmingly 
concentrated in precincts that have 60 percent or more black or Hispanic population.”). 
72. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 43-45 (describing the sources of decline). 
73. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WIN-
DOWS POLICING 8-11, 59-61, 80-82 (2001); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Bro-
ken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 465-67 
(2000); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observations of Public 
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The order-maintenance approach fails to explore how . . . the categories 
of the disorderly and the law abider . . . are themselves shaped by policing 
and punishment strategies. The result is that these categories mask the 
repressive nature of broken-windows policing and overshadow signifi-
cant costs, including increased complaints of police misconduct, racial 
bias in stops and frisks, and further stereotyping of black criminality.
74
 
Misdemeanorland tells the story of what the New York court system—its pros-
ecutors, judges, and public defenders—did with all those broken-windows cases. 
In essence, it treated them as an opportunity to exert control over the policed 
population through “marking,” “procedural hassle,” and “performance,” a col-
lection of social control practices that comprise what Kohler-Hausmann labels 
“managerial justice.” Kohler-Hausmann argues that New York’s managerial 
turn altered the significance and purpose of the low-level criminal process, that 
it became increasingly concerned with tracking and evaluating people. She con-
trasts the managerial model with what she terms the “adjudicative model,” 
which is concerned with evidence, convictions, and legal punishment.
75
 In the 
adjudicative model, the goal is to determine guilt: “the animating task organiz-
ing the work of criminal justice actors is to determine whether the defendant in 
fact committed the criminal act of which she is accused.”
76
 By contrast, manage-
rial justice is about evaluating people. “[T]he driving question—the one that de-
termines how prosecutors and judges will deal with the case—is about the type 
of person before them.”
77
 The book’s central claim is that New York’s lower-
level courts “have largely abandoned . . . the adjudicative model of criminal law 
administration—concerned with deciding guilt and punishment in specific 
cases—and instead operate under . . . the managerial model—concerned with 





Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 637-38 (1999); 
Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods—Does It Lead 
to Crime?, NAT’L INST. JUST. 4-5 (Feb. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/186049.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QTY7-SCUN] (“The forces that generate disorder also generate crime. It 
is the structural characteristics of neighborhoods, as well as neighborhood cohesion and in-
formal social control—not levels of disorder—that most affect crime.”). 
74. HARCOURT, supra note 73, at 7. 
75. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 4, 61. 
76. Id. at 71. 
77. Id. at 72. 
78. Id. at 4; see also id. at 10 (“[T]he city’s misdemeanor courts have largely abandoned the adju-
dicative model of criminal law administration and instead operate under the managerial 
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Although managerial justice has deep normative implications, Kohler-Haus-
mann explains its adoption as a largely pragmatic move on the part of legal offi-
cials, a “particularly rational adaptation to the profile of defendants and the re-
source constraints that actors face[d]” as a result of the massive influx of low-
level cases.
79
 “[A]s the lower criminal courts were flooded with cases from Bro-
ken Windows policing,” she narrates, “they drifted toward a managerial 
model.”
80
 The legal turn towards managerialism “can be understood as a result 
of creative problem solving in the face of the specific dilemmas and practical cir-
cumstances of doing legal work in misdemeanorland in the era of Broken Win-
dows policing.”
81
 “[L]ess the result of planned and purposeful policy design,” 
she writes, managerial justice represents an “adaptive emergence of practical 
strategies adopted by front-line legal actors in the shadow of the intentional pol-
icy choices made by the police and local and state governments.”
82
 Managerial-
ism itself is both an intentional and unintentional practice. “Sometimes criminal 
justice actors intentionally rely on [managerial] marking, procedural hassle, and 
performance,” but sometimes “these techniques emerge as the unintentional up-
shot of the uncertainty and transaction costs inherent in the criminal process.”
83
 
Prosecutors in misdemeanorland are the lead decision makers, but judges 
and defense attorneys accept and perpetuate managerialism.
84
 Judges ratify the 
approach because they face the same professional pressure to clear dockets as 
prosecutors and public defenders. And like prosecutors, judges accept manage-
rialism’s normative presumption that people brought into the misdemeanor sys-
tem should be marked, tracked, and managed in some way.
85
 Defense attorneys 
accede because it permits their clients to escape immediate conviction and 
harsher punishments, because they have heavy caseloads, and because litigation 
imposes substantial costs and risks on defendants. 
Although the managerial response to broken windows was highly pragmatic, 
according to Kohler-Hausmann it also reflected substantive, equitable changes 
 
model.”). But see id. at 93 (“These results do not prove that the adjudicative model has been 
thoroughly vanquished from misdemeanorland, nor is it my claim that it has been.”). 
79. Id. at 105. 
80. Id. at 85. 
81. Id. at 21; see also id. at 101 (“Frontline legal actors and managers . . . had to engage in creative 
problem solving in the face of the practical circumstances generated by Broken Windows po-
licing . . . .”). 
82. Id. at 58. 
83. Id. at 81. 
84. Id. at 258. 
85. Id. at 116-19 (discussing the management of prosecutorial and judicial dockets). 
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in prosecutorial thinking and decision-making. Instead of routinely seeking con-
viction, prosecutors accepted lighter forms of marking and tracking and the 
building of dossiers on defendants, “illustrat[ing] a sentiment that it is morally 
unnecessary for the heavy machinery of criminal justice to come down on every 
defendant accused of a low-level offense if the person can prove himself to be 
responsible and governable.”
86
 Prosecutors were willing to accept managerial 
justice “in lieu of formal punishment because it is a form of hard treatment that 
does not entail creating a lifelong criminal record, which they may believe is un-
warranted.”
87
 Managerial justice embodied a shift towards leniency—or, as 
Kohler-Hausmann puts it, a “substantive principle of proportionality, which is 
that people do not necessarily deserve to be punished for every incident of low-
level offending.”
88
 “The moral principle at work in the managerial model,” she 
explains, is “that we essentially don’t seek any punishment at all unless the per-
son demonstrates a persistent disregard for social rules and otherwise seems un-
moored from other institutions of social control.”
89
 
As an empirical matter, managerial justice in New York translated into wide-
spread criminalization. The vast majority of broken-windows arrests became 
criminal cases—at the outset, prosecutors declined to prosecute “somewhere be-
tween” 7% and 12% of those hundreds of thousands of arrests.
90
 Later in the 
process, prosecutors dismissed outright another 12% to 15%.
91
 The most fre-
quent trigger for these dismissals occurred when the speedy-trial clock ran out, 
initiating a “30.30,” which can take months.
92
 Approximately 25% to 30% of 
cases were resolved by an “adjournment in contemplation of dismissal,” (ACD), 
a kind of pretrial probation or diversion whereby the defendant may be required 
to adhere to various requirements, usually for six months to a year.
93
 If defend-
ants meet the conditions of their ACD, the case is dismissed and sealed. If they 
don’t, they are convicted. 
 
86. Id. at 74. 
87. Id. at 199. 
88. Id. at 73. 
89. Id. at 266. 
90. See id. at 146. 
91. See id. at 150. 
92. Id. at 150. These dismissals are referred to as “30.30” because they are authorized by section 
30.30 of New York Criminal Procedure Law. 
93. Id. An ACD lasts up to six months; an MJACD is a marijuana ACD and it lasts up to a year. 
Id. 
the high stakes of low-level criminal justice 
1669 
The rest of the cases, around 50%, resulted in a conviction of some kind—
20% for Class A or B misdemeanor crimes (“letter crimes”), and 30% for non-
criminal violations, mostly disorderly conduct.
94
 The vast majority of convic-
tions were the result of a plea—almost no one went to trial.
95
 Most dispositions 
in New York are fast—as many as two-thirds of dispositions occur at arraign-
ment, as soon as the defendant comes to court for the first time.
96
 Conversely, 
for those rare defendants who want to contest their guilt, the process is painfully 
slow; it can take months to get a trial.
97
 
New York has numerous rules of thumb when it comes to dispositions, based 
largely on prosecutorial guidelines. A person with no prior arrests facing a petit 
larceny charge will get “an ACD with the Stoplift program or a day of community 
service.”
98
 A person with a prior ACD on their record will not be offered another 
one. Offers are generally determined by the type of charge and the defendant’s 
prior record.
99
 Despite the relative speed and predictability of the process, 
Kohler-Hausmann repeatedly rejects the “assembly-line” metaphor used by the 
Supreme Court in 1972—and many scholars since then, including me—as a way 
of identifying speedy, rote, or mechanical aspects of the misdemeanor process.
100
 
She maintains that the metaphor inadequately captures the nuances of decision 
reflected, for example, in the differential treatment of first-time offenders, or the 
fact that many cases result not in conviction but in some other sort of disposition. 
Feeley also thought the term “assembly-line” too formulaic—he preferred the 
“supermarket” metaphor because it captured “the casualness and confusion 
characteristic of decision-making in the lower criminal courts.”
101
 The misde-
meanor apparatus has garnered many other nicknames and metaphors along the 
 
94. Id. at 68-69. 
95. Id. at 114 fig.3.4 (charting miniscule trial rates of less than one percent). 
96. Id. at 124, 162 (explaining that at broken-windows policing’s peak two-thirds of cases were 
resolved at arraignment, with the figure more recently decreasing to fifty-five percent); see also 
Boruchowitz et al., supra note 48, at 31 (documenting high plea rates at arraignment in New 
York). 
97. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 195. Suppression hearings—the defendant’s opportunity 
to exclude illegally obtained evidence—are also almost nonexistent. Id. at 116-17. 
98. Id. at 120-21 (describing official prosecutorial plea-offer guidelines). 
99. Id. at 125. 
100. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34-36 (1972) (describing the speed, large numbers of 
cases, and lack of due process characteristic of misdemeanor courts as a kind of “assembly-
line justice”); KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 60, 63, 66 & n.23 (citing various scholar-
ship, including mine, for the proposition that “the assembly-line justice critique has 
reemerged”). 
101. FEELEY, supra note 8, at 13, 187; KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 65 (“Feeley is one of the 
few observers of lower criminal courts to challenge the assembly-line metaphor as inapt.”). 
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Of course, no one actually thinks the misdemeanor system is completely 
“mechanical” or “one-size-fits-all.”
103
 But Misdemeanorland provides quite a few 
instances of speedy, rote, or mechanistic dispositions that are illustrative of why 
the assembly-line metaphor has stuck over the decades. In two boroughs, “the 
DA’s office had standard offers printed on a sheet that listed the office policy for 
arraignment offers by charge type and number of prior arrests.”
104
 “[T]here’s 
really no time,” observed one former prosecutor, “in the space of a thirty-second 
arraignment call to see how this case is different from any other case.”
105
 Because 
pleas are so standardized, “clerks and paralegals can guess which cases will be 
disposable simply by looking at the charging documents and rap sheets.”
106
 In 
one case, “the supervising arraignment lawyer for one of the public defender or-
ganizations[] walked over to the prosecution table with stacks of files, saying, 
‘all of these will be marijuana ACDs.’”
107
 In another case involving six different 
defendants, “[a]s soon as the court officer finished reading the charges, the judge 
immediately granted an ACD to all defendants en masse without any discus-
sion.”
108
 Similarly, “[i]n some courtrooms, judges issue marijuana ACDs with-
out requiring defendants to even walk up to the podium: their names are called, 
they stand up in the audience . . . while the judge issues the order, practically 
yelling it from the bench.”
109
 New York’s misdemeanorland may be evaluative, 
but it also has plenty of speedy, standardized qualities.
110
 
As people pass through misdemeanorland multiple times, they accumulate 
new and different marks which trigger increasing levels of punishment. The pro-
cess is “additive”: prosecutors make clear that people need to be punished more 
 
102. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 48, at 30 (comparing the misdemeanor process to cattle herd-
ing); id. at 33 (describing the “meet and plead” misdemeanor process); Jenny Roberts, Why 
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 277, 370 (2011) (calling the misdemeanor process “McJustice”). 
103. Cf. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 60 (“[O]ne of the most common allegations levied 
at lower criminal courts by higher courts and academic commentators is that of ‘assembly-
line justice’—mechanically churning out convictions and imposing one-size-fits-all punish-
ments.”). 
104. Id. at 125. 
105. Id. at 129. 
106. Id. at 126. 
107. Id. at 148. 
108. Id. at 129. 
109. Id. at 149. 
110. See id. at 121 (describing prosecutorial guidelines). 
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if they’ve been to misdemeanorland before. “The understanding is that . . . a de-
fendant should be subjected to more marking, procedural hassle, or performance 
for each subsequent encounter or failure to discharge some requirement of the 
current encounter.”
111
 “Our offers are progressive,” says one prosecutor. “[F]irst 
the ACD, then the violation, then the misdemeanor, etc.[,] etc., etc.”
112
 Indeed, 
the number and quality of marks on a person’s record often play a greater role in 
determining the state’s response than the nature of the crime itself.
113
 
Because broken-windows policing predictably sweeps in disadvantaged clas-
ses of people from identifiably poor neighborhoods of color, this infuses misde-
meanor processing with race- and class-based significance. As Kohler-Haus-
mann explains, “Arrests from these spaces have a social meaning, one that 
translates into a presumption of need for social control over the people who are 
brought from them to misdemeanorland.”
114
 “[S]pace, race, and ethnicity in-
fused [broken-windows] arrests with a special set of meanings that would shape 
how legal actors would process those arrests.”
115
 In this narrative, the legal pro-
cess inherited the class and racial assumptions embedded in broken-windows 
policing regarding which neighborhoods and people are disorderly: “[T]he dis-
position patterns in misdemeanorland . . . seemed institutionally viable given 
the social meaning of the infractions and defendant profile at hand.”
116
 As a re-
sult, “the populations that are most heavily targeted by Broken Windows polic-
ing, namely, low-income men of color, become a population with an ongoing 
burden to prove governability in lower criminal courts.”
117
 Taken together, these 
social practices and assumptions operationalized a suspicious attitude toward the 
defendant pool. 
 
111. Id. at 82-83. 
112. Id. at 84. 
113. See id. at 74 (“[O]ne of the most important determinants of case dispositions is the record of 
a defendant’s prior criminal justice encounters . . . .”); see also id. at 96 (“[T]he prior record 
of the defendant becomes one of the most important determinants of the outcome.”); id. at 
166 (relating statement by a public defender that “innocent people with records” will be of-
fered a disorderly conduct plea rather than a dismissal); id. at 261 (“Defendants come to be the 
type of person who ought to be convicted by achieving a certain status in misdemeanorland, 
a status that is only to varying degrees achieved by establishing violations of specific provi-
sions of the penal law.”). 
114. Id. at 53. 
115. Id. at 59. 
116. Id. at 50. 
117. Id. at 79. 
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B. Mapping Managerialism: Marking, Procedural Hassle, and Performance 







 These chapters 
detail the ways that the process handles people and cases, “explicat[ing] the tech-
niques through which misdemeanor criminal court actors extend social control 
over the populations they encounter.”
121
 This is the core of Kohler-Hausmann’s 
fieldwork. She offers aggregate data and numerous stories depicting the specifics 
of criminal record-keeping, the burdens imposed on individual defendants, and 
how defendants are measured and evaluated in ways that affect their legal treat-
ment and case dispositions.
122
 She lightly implies that these practices are irra-
tional by starting Chapters Four, Five, and Six with quotations from Franz 
Kafka’s The Trial,
123
 but her ultimate conclusion is that, far from irrational, they 
represent intelligible, pragmatic, and arguably defensible systemic legal compro-
mises with broken-windows policing.
124
 
The chapter on “marking” describes New York’s massive investment in rec-
ord keeping, which forms the backbone of the managerial approach. Before the 
1990s, New York did not keep particularly close track of low-level defendants or 
their arrests, appearances, or performances.
125
 This changed with the advent of 
broken windows and the intensive data-management practices known as 
CompStat—these policies created detailed records about people in the system 
while erecting a new infrastructure capable of managing that data.
126
 Today, 
New York prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges know how many times 
people are arrested, cited, charged, given an ACD, or issued a warrant, and they 
 
118. Id. at 143. 
119. Id. at 183. 
120. Id. at 221. 
121. Id. at 10. 
122. See id. at 17 (describing fieldwork through 2016); id. at 19 (describing data through 2011). 
123. Id. at 143, 183, 221 (quoting FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Tribeca Books 2015) (1925)). 
124. Id. at 266 (arguing that, at least in the abstract, managerial justice “seems like a perfectly rea-
sonable” approach for legal officials to take); id. at 105 (describing managerial justice as a 
“particularly rational adaptation to the profile of defendants and the resource constraints that 
actors face”); id. at 123 (noting that in light of heavy prosecutorial caseloads and delays, “one 
can see how the strategies of [managerialism] emerge as rational means for achieving a meas-
ure of social control over a substantial volume of misdemeanor defendants”); id. at 264 
(“There is both an efficiency and fairness argument to be made for the managerial 
model . . . .”). 
125. See id. at 31-32. 
126. See id. at 36-41. 
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know whether a defendant showed up late to court or flunked a treatment pro-
gram. These records in turn play a central role in determining case dispositions. 
Prosecutors make plea offers in light of a defendant’s entire dossier, not just the 
nature of the current crime for which they have been arrested. “Judges and pros-
ecutors frequently say that one of the most important determinants of case dis-
position is the record of a defendant’s prior criminal justice encounters, such as 
arrests, bench warrants, compliance with court mandates, and other indications 
of governability, including steady employment, family, or housing connec-
tion.”
127
 This is especially true at arraignment, which is when more than half of 
all cases are resolved: the record dominates at the beginning of the case because 
the lawyers have few facts about the case at hand. 
The marking analysis is central to the book’s project because it supports the 
thesis that New York’s misdemeanorland is exerting managerial control—eval-
uating people—as much or more than it is doing traditional criminal adjudica-
tion aimed at determining guilt or innocence. To state the obvious, whether a 
person shows up to court has nothing to do with whether she has committed a 
crime. Nevertheless, under managerialism, failing to show up will impact the 
substantive outcome of her case. The chapter also indirectly elucidates the im-
portance of record keeping in misdemeanor processing more generally. New 
York keeps copious data on its misdemeanor criminal dockets, as well as the peo-
ple in them.
128
 Most other jurisdictions collect and provide far less misdemeanor 
data, or none at all.
129
 The specificity of social control in New York thus turns at 
least in part on the state’s willingness to invest in data collection. Ironically, this 
particular investment in social control also increases the transparency of the en-




127. Id. at 74. 
128. See id. at 19 (describing Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and numerous other 
official data sources). This data is what allows Kohler-Hausmann to dig so deeply into the 
specifics and may also account for why a disproportionate percentage of previous misde-
meanor scholarship has involved New York. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative In-
nocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1694 n.179 (2010) 
(“I rely principally on New York City misdemeanor enforcement and adjudication data . . . [in 
part] because the city maintains better records than most urban jurisdictions . . . .”); M. Chris 
Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors: Understanding “Zero Tolerance Policing” as a Form of 
Collective Punishment and Human Rights Violation, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 373 (2011); Howell, supra 
note 23, at 283-90; Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157 (2004). 
129. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (describing the opacity of many misdemeanor 
court systems). 
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on what basis the misdemeanor process is sorting people, the nature of disposi-
tions, or even how many cases there are altogether. One of the takeaways from 
Misdemeanorland is how revelatory more aggregate data in this realm could be.
130
 
The chapter on “procedural hassle” describes the many burdens that the mis-
demeanor process imposes on those who pass through it.
131
 Hassle encompasses 
a wide range of defendant experiences, including the intrusive “ceremony of deg-
radation” that constitutes arrest;
132
 the filthy stench of the holding pens at cen-
tral booking;
133
 waiting in long lines at the courthouse;
134
 and having to come 
back to court repeatedly, missing work, or having to find childcare.
135
 The pur-
pose of hassle is to create “a series of opportunities to engage defendants in offi-
cial encounters with symbolic meaning, construct their status vis-à-vis the court 
and its powers, and to discipline and reform their behavior.”
136
 Hassle puts peo-
ple in their place, establishes their “denigrated” social status within the criminal 
process, and wears down their sense of autonomy and dignity.
137
 
The criminal process is famously oppressive and degrading, especially for the 
poor, and Misdemeanorland offers powerful examples. In police-precinct holding 
cells where arrested defendants wait for their court appearances, “[r]ats, mice, 
and roaches are a common sighting, and smashed cheese sandwiches, the only 
food offered during the entire arrest-to-arraignment period, litter the floor, in 
part because people sometimes use the plastic-wrapped sandwiches as pil-
lows.”
138
 The “filth and stench of the precinct holding cell” was so disgusting 
and traumatizing that one defendant, Kima, would not sit down on the bench; 
instead, she stood for seven hours.
139
 Some defendants are issued “desk-appear-
ance tickets” instead of being arrested; they must appear in court to resolve 
them. In order to do so, they “need to take off at least one day from work or 
 
130. The nonprofit organization Measures for Justice is beginning to gather some of this data from 
states around the country. See MEASURES FOR JUST., https://measuresforjustice.org 
[https://perma.cc/KA4H-UT8H]; see also FLA. STAT. § 900.05 (2018) (imposing data collec-
tion requirements on criminal justice actors). 
131. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 183-220. 
132. Id. at 184 (citing Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. 
SOC. 420 (1956)). 
133. Id. at 186-67. 
134. Id. at 188-89. 
135. Id. at 193. 
136. Id. at 183. 
137. Id. at 220. 
138. Id. at 188. 
139. Id. at 187. 
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child-care responsibilities to come to the courthouse at 9:00 a.m . . . . They must 
then sit patiently in a crowded courtroom, sometimes all day . . . waiting for 
their 60-120 seconds in front of the judge.”
140
 If they cannot stay all day and 
instead leave during the lunchbreak, a warrant will be issued.
141
 Jannelle, a col-
lege student, described how her sense of self was “despoiled” by spending time 
in the jail and by being publicly humiliated in the courtroom.
142
 It is one of the 
special contributions of Misdemeanorland that it offers such a thick, vivid account 
of how the process actually becomes the punishment. 
Finally, the third central feature of managerial justice is “performance.” 
Kohler-Hausmann defines performance as 
a distinct penal technique [showing that] the defendant has discharged 
some meaningful undertaking that is evaluated by court officials. He has 
complied with some duty, assigned task, program activity, therapeutic 
encounter, or proposed some other behavioral accomplishment the court 




Required performances include showing up to court on time, conforming to 
court demands, participating in various programs, and demonstrating participa-
tion in work, childcare, and other responsible behaviors. Performance is closely 
related to hassle: some hassles are also required performances. Performance is 
also intimately tied to marking: succeeding or failing at a particular performance 
generates a record and becomes the basis for the system’s ongoing evaluation. 
“Performance is a tool,” writes Kohler-Hausmann, “that allows prosecutors and 
judges to observe some capacity of defendants to follow official directives in the 
face of profound uncertainty about what type of person the defendant is.”
144
 
Many if not most performance demands have nothing to do with crime or a 
defendant’s culpability, but they are not random: they “bear some rational rela-
tion to what might be imagined as propensities for law abiding in general.”
145
 
They are tests of people’s ability and willingness to follow rules, to submit to 
 
140. Id. at 193; see also id. at 198, 214-20 (describing long courtroom waits). 
141. Id. at 194. 
142. Id. at 192. The word despoiled is Kohler-Hausmann’s, not Jannelle’s. 
143. Id. at 221. 
144. Id. at 228-29. 
145. Id. at 229. 
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authority, and thus to “prove governability.”
146
 This is the ultimate aim of man-
agerial justice: “Prosecutors and judges inspect defendants’ performances for 
signs that they can be guided by official directives or are enmeshed in main-
stream institutions, activities, and lifestyles.”
147
 One implicit consequence of this 
systematic reliance on performance is to overpunish the poor. An employed per-
son who shows up on time to court and makes childcare arrangements will be 
treated more leniently, while a person too poor to get a subway ticket and with 
no social support network to care for his or her children will be punished for 
noncompliance even if their criminal behavior is less culpable. 
This exegesis of performance is central to Misdemeanorland’s worldview and 
makes a substantial contribution to the scholarly conversation around misde-
meanors. It gives descriptive teeth to the vague term “social control.” It adds to 
a long sociological tradition that critiques the specific mechanisms used to con-
trol the poor.
148
 In one of the pithiest expressions of the book’s descriptive thesis, 
Kohler-Hausmann writes: 
As in welfare offices, the way performances are demanded and evaluated 
in misdemeanorland expresses the presumption of need for social control 
that arises from the social standing of the people subject to its power. 
The subjects of Broken Windows policing are almost exclusively poor 
people of color from the city’s most disadvantaged neighborhoods. The 
penal technique of performance in lower criminal courts mirrors a theme 
that is repeated in multiple sites: that these populations are inherently 
disorderly and must affirmatively prove their fitness for freedom.
149
 
The performance mandate also supports Misdemeanorland’s claim that there 
has been a shift in the aims of the low-level criminal justice endeavor. Tradition-
ally, a criminal case is thought to evaluate a very specific sort of performance—
whether or not the defendant has violated a particular criminal law. A great deal 
of criminal law, procedure, and evidence doctrine is devoted to ensuring that 
 
146. Id. at 222. 
147. Id. 
148. See generally PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 
IN AMERICA (2017); GUSTAFSON, supra note 28; WACQUANT, supra note 27; see also supra notes 
25-30 and accompanying text (describing criminalization-of-poverty literature). 
149. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 224. 
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people are convicted only for what they do, not for their general character, per-
sonal traits, or social status.
150
 Misdemeanorland shows that this traditional func-
tion now coexists with mandatory performances and other demands of manage-
rial justice that measure not criminal conduct, but general rule compliance and 
governability. 
i i i .  the punitive spectrum: from managerialism to 
conventional punishment 
Misdemeanorland illuminates the breadth and depth of the spectrum of puni-
tive options exercised by the petty-offense process. Although Kohler-Hausmann 
concludes that “the managerial model better describes the vast majority of oper-
ations in New York City’s lower courts,” managerialism is not the entire story; 
she notes that “lower courts [also] maintain some adjudicative traits.”
151
 Part of 
appreciating managerial justice involves recognizing the extent to which New 
York still punishes, incarcerates, and formally convicts many of its misdemeanor 
subjects. Although Misdemeanorland is not a comparative project, its excavation 
of New York practices invites comparisons with other jurisdictions that rely 
more or less heavily on conventional punishment or that may be engaging in 
managerialism in their own ways.
152
 Accepting New York as exemplary of the 
managerial model, this Part unpacks the persistence of conventional punishment 
in the New York system in order to clarify the scope of that punitive spectrum 
and to open up a comparative conversation. 
Misdemeanorland offers numerous examples of how New York continues to 
convict and punish in traditional ways. For example, the procedural-hassle cat-
egory includes many impositions that are also classically punitive or well under-
stood as collateral consequences of conviction. These can include license suspen-
sions and the loss of credit, jobs, and money.
153
 
Misdemeanorland is not centrally concerned with incarceration—the most fa-
miliar form of punishment—because, as Kohler-Hausmann states at the outset, 
 
150. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (prohibiting the introduction of character evidence); Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (striking down a statute criminalizing the status of 
being unemployed or vagrant); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 661 (1962) (holding that due 
process is violated by the criminalization of addict status). 
151. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 93. 
152. Id. at 16 (“Findings from one place [such as New York] can alert us to phenomena at a differ-
ent one, such as noncarceral penal power that operates by virtue of record keeping, iterative 
encounters with courts, or the evaluation of actions during those encounters.”). 
153. Id. at 195 (“[A]ny misdemeanor drug conviction triggers a six-month license suspension . . . . 
If a person can’t pay the mandatory court fees, civil judgment is disastrous for credit.”). 
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“noncarceral penal operations . . . constitute the largest component of our crim-
inal justice system’s operations.”
154
 Although jail is still “a pressing policy issue,” 
she writes, it is “less common than . . . most people would guess.”
155
 But New 
York still routinely deploys incarceration. Approximately 10% of convicted de-
fendants receive a prospective jail sentence, while another 15% are sentenced to 
time served, namely, incarceration that they have already experienced.
156
 Thou-
sands more spend brief periods of time in jail upon arrest or after being picked 
up on a warrant.
157
 Jail is especially influential when bail is set: 80% of people 
set bail cannot afford it and therefore face jailtime at the notoriously dangerous 
Rikers Island. This is where sixteen-year-old Kalief Browder spent thirty-three 
months awaiting trial for a robbery charge, an experience that drove him to com-
mit suicide.
158
 The threat of Rikers, in turn, induces guilty pleas.
159
 
Even for those who do not go to Rikers, the pretrial incarceration experience 
is highly punitive. The chapter on hassle describes the squalor of police precinct 
jail cells, holding pens in Central Booking infested with vermin, and a single 
toilet used by dozens of people.
160
 People stand for hours, or even all night, ra-
ther than sit or lie down on the unsanitary floors.
161
 Researchers have shown, 
moreover, that just a few days of incarceration can alter a person’s life trajectory, 
including the disposition of their criminal case, their sentence, and their likeli-
hood of future offending.
162
 All of this is to say that even managerial justice de-
ploys the punitive pains and burdens of incarceration in a wide variety of ways. 
Likewise, formal conviction remains important in New York. Kohler-Haus-
mann states that “[a]mong my empirical findings are that misdemeanorland is 
a place that produces very few criminal convictions . . . and it is a site where legal 
 
154. Id. at 11. 
155. Id. 
156. See id. at 70. 
157. Id. at 33, 36 (describing the heightened warrant enforcement under broken-windows polic-
ing). 
158. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/8L8J-788R]. 
159. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 164 (“Most defendants will accept a guilty plea when 
they are being held in on bail.”); Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc
/N6PD-AXEN]. 
160. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 183-220. 
161. Id. at 187-89. 
162. Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. 
L. REV. 711, 741-68 (2017) (documenting how short periods of incarceration affect people over 
the long term). 
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actors do very little adjudication.”
163
 And indeed, overall conviction rates fell af-
ter broken windows inundated the courts. Nonetheless, between 2010 and 2015, 
roughly half of all misdemeanor defendants in New York were still formally con-
victed.
164
 Because broken windows created a massive influx of cases, that meant 
that approximately 100,000 New Yorkers were formally convicted every year 
since 2000.
165
 To be sure, not all convictions are created equal: approximately 
thirty percent of all dispositions were noncriminal convictions, mostly for disor-
derly conduct (“dis con”), while no more than twenty percent were convictions 
for a Class A or B criminal misdemeanor.
166
 But dis-con convictions are not as 
lenient as the label “noncriminal” makes them sound. Disorderly conduct carries 
up to fifteen days in jail, and the mark of a dis con remains punitive in its own 
right, interfering with job security, housing, and future encounters with the 
criminal process.
167
 As one public defender put it, 
I think that the dis con resolution is underrated, in terms of the effect 
that it has on people’s lives. Especially for young people getting ar-
rested . . . because a dis con appears on your rap sheet. So you think a dis 
con is no big deal—it’s a violation, it’s not a crime. But it appears. And it 
will turn into a misdemeanor if you are at all at risk at having the in-
creased police contact—which lots of our clients are.
168
 
One of the central arguments in Misdemeanorland is that because New York 
relies heavily on ACDs and does not immediately insist on formal conviction, it 
has “largely abandoned” attention to guilt and its attendant formal punishments, 
replacing it with a lighter managerial commitment to evaluation and informal 
control.
169
 This argument resonates with an ongoing national conversation re-
 
163. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 4. 
164. Id. at 153. The conviction rate is lower for the cohorts of MJACDs on which Kohler-Hausmann 
focuses. Id. at 86-87. 
165. Id. at 68 fig.2.1. 
166. Id. at 153 (“The statutory definition of disorderly conduct is very broad. In practice, the mark 
of a ‘dis con’ conviction does not indicate that the defendant is guilty of any specific illegal 
conduct. Rather, it serves as an all-purpose generic charge to mark the defendant.”). 
167. Id. at 158-59 (noting that even though dis-con records may be sealed for rap-sheet purposes, 
noncriminal conviction court records never seal, so prosecutors and judges can always find 
them later). 
168. Id. at 97. 
169. Id. at 10; id. at 264 (describing the “managerial approach [as] eschewing the heavy machinery 
of criminal law unless there is some indication the person persistently flouts legal rules”); see 
supra text accompanying notes 17-20. 
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garding diversionary dispositions such as ACDs, which are highly popular re-
forms and widely touted as a lenient solution to overcriminalization.
170
 But Mis-
demeanorland incidentally reveals how much diversionary dispositions and con-
victions still have in common. ACDs are pretrial probations that substantially 
mark and burden defendants. “An ACD is a dismissal,” explains one prosecutor, 
“but one way to phrase it is it involves a six-month probationary period.”
171
 A 
judge calls it “a low-maintenance form of probation.”
172
 The mark is theoreti-
cally temporary—it is sealed upon dismissal six months or a year later if the de-
fendant complies with all the terms of the probation
173
—but it does a lot of con-
viction-like work in the meantime. While the case is open, it sits in the state’s 
public, searchable online database where anyone can find it. People may be dis-
qualified from, suspended from, or dismissed from various jobs.
174
 
Sometimes the mark stays on people’s records even when it should not.
175
 
Another prosecutor “explained that whenever she sees an ACD on the rap sheet, 
even one that should have sealed but did not because of some administrative 
error (which is surprisingly common) she ‘knows not to offer the ACD 
again.’”
176
 New York prosecutors also fight to retain access to ACD marks. “An 
 
170. See Erica McWhorter & David LaBahn, Confronting the Elephants in the Courtroom Through 
Prosecutor Led Diversion Efforts, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1222 (2016) (advocating for increased diver-
sionary programs, which the authors, the Deputy General Counsel and President/CEO of the 
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, argue can reduce reoffending, conserve resources, and 
diminish collateral harms of prosecution); 21 Principles for the 21
st
 Century Prosecutor, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST. 4 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications
/FJP_21Principles_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5K5-4YNM] (explaining that the first 
principle of better prosecution is to “make diversion the rule”). But see Shaila Dewan & An-
drew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crime-criminal-justice-reform-diversion.html 
[https://perma.cc/8URF-RSS4] (describing how some prosecutors charge exorbitant fees to 
defendants for participating in diversion programs). 
171. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 84. 
172. Id. at 147. 
173. Id. at 147-48. 
174. Id. at 151. 
175. Id. at 84 (noting that administrative error is “surprisingly common”). As New York State’s 
Attorney General, Andrew Cuomo investigated ChoicePoint, a national data collection com-
pany, and several large New York employers for improperly gathering and relying on dis-
missed and sealed records in making employment decisions. Editorial, Denied a Chance for 
Honest Work, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/opinion
/19tue3.html [https://perma.cc/6HDS-J2W8]; Adam Liptak, Expunged Criminal Records Live 
to Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/us 
/17expunge.html [https://perma.cc/G73F-FZQP]. 
176. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 163. 
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increasingly common [prosecutorial] practice . . . is demanding that defendants 
‘waive’ sealing altogether.”
177
 Moreover, “conditional marks like the ACD can 
transform into permanent marks if a person fails to discharge a mandated per-
formance or cannot withstand the procedural demands of misdemeanorland.”
178
 
Kohler-Hausmann does not say how many people with ACDs successfully com-
plete their probations, but nationally approximately one-third of probationers 
fail their probations,
179
 so presumably some nontrivial percentage of New York 
ACDs eventually convert to convictions.
180
 
This spectrum of managerial and adjudicative punishment in New York sug-
gests ways of evaluating misdemeanor decision-making in other jurisdictions. 
In Connecticut, for example, 60% of misdemeanors are resolved by a “nolle pros-
equi,” which in practice is a deferred prosecution that works similarly to an 
ACD.
181
 Future sociologists might investigate whether Connecticut exhibits 
other managerial traits such as heavy investments in individual record keeping 
or intrusive performance requirements. In Texas county courts, by contrast, ap-
proximately 42% of misdemeanor cases result in guilty pleas; approximately 32% 
are dismissed; and only about 14% of cases are diverted.
182
 In Kentucky, over 
 
177. Id. at 175. 
178. Id. at 176. 
179. Shaila Dewan, Probation May Sound Light, but Punishments Can Land Hard, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/03/us/probation-sounding-light-can-land 
-hard.html [https://perma.cc/NBX2-HGMF]; see also Probation and Parole Systems Marked by 
High Stakes, Missed Opportunities, PEW 9 & fig.6 (Sept. 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org 
/-/media/assets/2018/09/probation_and_parole_systems_marked_by_high_stakes
_missed_opportunities_pew.pdf [https://perma.cc/42JT-AJXE] (documenting a one-third 
probation-failure rate nationally). 
180. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 261 (describing large classes of people who “quite 
often fail these conditional leniency offers”). 
181. NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 43-44 & n.5. In Connecticut, a nolle prosequi represents a decision 
not to prosecute, but the prosecutor retains the right to reopen the case over the next thirteen 
months. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(c) (2017); see also Kirk R. Williams, Family Violence 
Risk Assessment: A Predictive Cross-Validation Study, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 120, 122 (2012) 
(describing Connecticut treatment of a “nolle [as] no prosecution, but the case stays open for 
13 months and if violations occur, the case can be reopened”); E-mail from Joseph Greelish, 
Deputy Dir., Conn. Judicial Branch, to author (Sept. 5, 2017) (on file with author) (describing 
Connecticut practice). 
182. Spreadsheet from Texas Administrative Office of the Courts (unpublished data) (on file with 
author). 
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60% of order-maintenance, marijuana-possession, DUI, and driving-on-a-sus-
pended-license misdemeanor cases result in conviction.
183
 LaFave’s treatise esti-
mates that at least thirteen percent of U.S. misdemeanor cases are dismissed and 
another fifteen percent are diverted, while the rest result in conviction.
184
 Every 
jurisdiction thus deploys its own mix of traditional criminal tools of conviction, 
punishment, and social control, as well the more informal but still burdensome 
marks and controls that fall short of conviction. Misdemeanorland nicely illumi-
nates this spectrum of state responses to low-level criminal conduct and the com-
plex relationship between formal and informal punishments. 
iv.  an adversarial take on the managerial compromise 
A central feature of the American adjudicative model is the adversarial rela-
tionship between prosecution and defense. Unlike inquisitorial systems, adver-
sarial systems rely on the clash between defense and prosecution to ensure accu-
racy and to enforce due process and other procedural rights.
185
 As the Supreme 
Court has often said, the right to counsel is the system’s primary means for test-
ing the government’s evidence and guaranteeing accurate outcomes.
186
 Misde-
meanorland argues that New York’s misdemeanor system largely replaced the ad-
judicative model with managerialism, in particular with managerialism’s 
disregard for evidence and guilt. But that characterization—and the adjudica-
tive/managerial binary more generally—does not quite capture the persistence 
of the adversarial quality of the New York’s system. More specifically, it does not 
 
183. Spreadsheet from Kentucky Department of Information and Technology Services Research 
and Statistics (unpublished data) (on file with author). Kentucky provided data on order-
maintenance-type offenses such as trespassing and disorderly conduct, as well as DUI, driving 
on a suspended license, and other comparable traffic misdemeanors. Id. 
184. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.11(c-1), Westlaw (database updated 
Nov. 2018). 
185. See, e.g., Darryl Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Ad-
judication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1589-91 (2005) (describing how the erosion of the adversar-
ial nature of criminal procedure affects adjudicative accuracy); Máximo Langer, Rethinking 
Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Pro-
cedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 255-56 (2006) (explaining how the adversarial context moder-
ates prosecutorial powers in plea bargaining). 
186. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (“The purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.”); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 
655 (1984) (“The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan 
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be 
convicted and the innocent go free.” (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 
(1975))). 
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address whether those adversarial practices might represent a lingering commit-
ment to procedural adjudicative norms. 
This omission is a natural consequence of the book’s definition of the adju-
dicative model as one concerned with evidence and guilt—it is a model defined 
by its substantive interests, not its procedural character.
187
 But procedurally 
speaking, adversarialism is integral to the practice of adjudication and consti-
tutes the primary means through which adjudicative commitments to evidence, 
guilt, and rules are effectuated.
188
 The fact that New York lower courts remain 
robustly adversarial thus complicates the managerial story. 
Although Misdemeanorland does not grapple explicitly with the structural 
role of defense counsel, it offers rich descriptions of how public defenders navi-
gate the system on behalf of their clients. Drawing on the many adversarial nar-
ratives contained in Misdemeanorland, this section proposes understanding man-
agerialism as a prosecutorial compromise not only with broken-windows 
policing but with New York’s storied and aggressive public-defense bar. As the 
book describes it, New York defense counsel put up substantial resistance to con-
victions and to the “meet ’em and plead ’em” mindset, even as prosecutors stub-
bornly resist dismissal. This persistent conflict indicates that the adjudicatory 
adversarial system is alive and well in New York, and that managerialism might 
even be one of its byproducts. If so, Misdemeanorland could provide new insights 
into the full costs and consequences of the national misdemeanor-public-defense 
crisis. 
A. Gideon in Misdemeanor Processing 
One of the best-documented characteristics of the national misdemeanor 




187. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 4; see also id. at 61 (defining the adjudicative model 
as one in which “the role of court actors is to adjudicate the factual guilt or innocence of a 
defendant in a particular case”); id. at 72 (“[T]his [adjudicative] model does not require that 
courts adjudicate the question of guilt and punishment according to any specific type of for-
mal or adversarial process.”). But see id. at 263 (describing the New York system as “ostensibly 
adjudicative and adversarial”). 
188. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (describing the U.S. commitment to the 
adversarial system); Brown, supra note 185, at 1588, 1590 (describing the weaknesses of ad-
versarial adjudication in a system of plea bargaining). 
189. See Grassley Statement, supra note 4; Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for 
Equal Justice, A.B.A. (2004) [hereinafter Gideon’s Broken Promise], https://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp
_execsummary.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6WP-Z7PM] (discussing problems 
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meanor defendants are not constitutionally entitled to counsel if their convic-
tions cannot result in incarceration.
190
 But most misdemeanor defendants face 
the possibility of incarceration one way or another, and in many courtrooms they 
do not get lawyers and are never informed of their constitutional right to one. In 
one Pennsylvania court, for example, misdemeanor defendants were simply told 
to go to the basement to negotiate a plea deal directly with the prosecutor, after 
which they came “back up to the courtroom to plead guilty and be sentenced.”
191
 
In Georgia, observers watched a judge inform a large group of misdemeanor de-
fendants of their rights. After the judge left the bench, three prosecutors in-
structed the defendants to form a line and follow them one at a time into a private 
room. When the judge returned to the courtroom, each defendant came forward 
with the prosecutor, who informed the judge that each defendant had waived 
their right to counsel and wanted to plead guilty.
192
 “The dirty little secret of the 
criminal justice system,” admitted one Kentucky defender, “is that most eligible 
people do not get defenders.”
193
 
Sometimes, it is not even a secret. In 2007, Jean Hoefer Toal, Chief Justice of 
the South Carolina Supreme Court, candidly admitted at a public meeting that 
South Carolina does not appoint counsel even when clearly required by the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Alabama v. Shelton.
194
 As she explained, 
Alabama v. Shelton [is] one of the more misguided decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court, I must say. If we adhered to it in South Carolina 
we would have the right to counsel probably . . . by dragooning lawyers 
out of their law offices to take these cases in every magistrate’s court in 
South Carolina, and I have simply told my magistrates that we just don’t 
have the resources to do that. So I will tell you straight up we [are] not 




in indigent defense including lack of adequate funding and inadequate legal representation); 
Boruchowitz et al., supra note 48, at 14-20. 
190. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). 
191. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 48, at 17. 
192. See Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 189, at 24-25. 
193. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 48, at 15. 
194. 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (requiring the appointment of counsel when a defendant is sentenced to 
revocable probation or a suspended sentence). 
195. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 48, at 15; see also Price, supra note 51, at 18-19 (documenting the 
absence of defense counsel in South Carolina summary courts); Smith et al., supra note 53, at 
16 (same). 
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In most jurisdictions, public defenders have notoriously heavy caseloads.
196
 
Average spending in the United States on indigent defense is $11.86 per capita,
197
 
less than two percent of the $265 billion spent annually on the justice system.
198
 
The ABA recommends caseloads of no more than 300 misdemeanor cases per 
year.
199
 Nevertheless, public defenders in Dallas juggle 1,200 misdemeanors each 
year; in Chicago, Atlanta, and Miami, annual caseloads exceed 2,000.
200
 As a 
result of these pressures, public defenders often have mere minutes to meet their 
clients, review their files, and provide representation—hence the nickname 
“meet ’em and plead ’em” lawyering.
201
 In 2013, a federal district court in Wash-
ington State declared this state of affairs unconstitutional.
202
 In 2015, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee heard testimony that “in many places people go to court 
with no lawyers at all, or the lawyers they have are overwhelmed with cases, 
poorly trained, poorly paid, and operating without necessary support such as 
investigation and expert witness resources.”
203
 
The national paucity of misdemeanor defense counsel makes New York es-
pecially interesting: every defendant in New York gets a lawyer. State law pro-
vides counsel for all misdemeanor defendants, whether they face incarceration 
or not.
204
 Thus, people who are not constitutionally entitled to counsel, and who 
would not get counsel elsewhere, are represented. 
 
196. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases and No Time, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public 
-defender-case-loads.html [https://perma.cc/BKN9-BMT8]. 
197. A Race to the Bottom: Speed and Savings over Due Process: A Constitutional Crisis, NAT’L LEGAL 
AID & DEF. ASS’N, at ii (2008), http://www.mynlada.org/michigan/michigan_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A9QD-G36Y]. 
198. Tracey Kyckelhahn, Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts, 2012 - Preliminary, BUREAU 
JUST. STAT. tbl.1 (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5239 
[https://perma.cc/349X-TBE3] (download “comma-delimited format (CSV)”; then open 
“jeeus1201.csv”) (displaying for fiscal year 2012 the “[p]ercent distribution of expenditure for 
the justice system by type of government”). 
199. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 72 & 
n.13 (3d ed. 1992). 
200. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 48, at 21. 
201. Id. at 33. 
202. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
203. Protecting the Constitutional Right to Counsel for Indigents Charged with Misdemeanors: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of Robert C. Bo-
ruchowitz, Professor, Seattle University School of Law). 
204. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10.3 (Consol. 2018) (“The defendant has the right to the aid of 
counsel at the arraignment and at every subsequent stage of the action.”); see also 32 NEW 
YORK JURISPRUDENCE: CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE § 738 (2d ed. 2016). 
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Furthermore, Misdemeanorland indicates that the New York defense bar is 
highly engaged. The book is full of accounts of aggressive representation in 
which a defense attorney’s tenaciousness resulted in demonstrably better out-
comes. In these accounts, New York defenders are clearly overloaded like their 
national counterparts,
205
 but they still understand their mission as one of zealous 
representation. “Of course you are going to have done your investigation. Of 
course you are going to research it,” remarks one public defender.
206
 A prosecu-
tor relates that there is “[a] lot of . . . fighting in criminal court between the de-
fense bar and the prosecution over the ‘letter’ [taking a Class A or B misde-
meanor].”
207
 In one case, a public defender’s herculean efforts over eight months 
and fourteen court appearances led to her client’s full-out acquittal.
208
 In an-
other, a persistent defender managed to get a resistant prosecutor to “‘come off 
the misdemeanor’ and offer a violation plea.”
209
 Advocacy takes place on an in-
stitutional as well as individual level: when prosecutors proposed increasing the 
weight of an ACD mark, “defense organizations strenuously resisted.”
210
 Misde-
meanorland thus reveals with specificity just how impactful a robust defense bar 
can be in the world of petty offenses. 
B. Prosecutorial Complicity in Broken-Windows Policing 
Defense zealousness is especially significant in New York because prosecu-
tors are deeply reluctant to dismiss cases. Prosecutors treat almost all arrests as 
presumptively meaningful incidents of criminality that require some punitive re-
sponse. There is “an institutional disposition to do something with these cases.”
211
 
As one prosecutor put it, “I can tell you that we don’t dismiss cases. I mean we 
do, but we have to have proof that [the defendant] is not guilty.”
212
 Even where 
 
205. See, e.g., KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 118. 
206. Id. at 134. 
207. Id. at 153. 
208. Id. at 137. 
209. Id. at 164; see also id. at 200 (describing an incident in which a defense attorney used a letter 
from the client’s employer to negotiate an ACD); id. at 201-02 (relaying an incident in which 
defense counsel deployed a delay tactic to the benefit of the client); id. at 262 (describing an 
incident in which a defense attorney “forcefully” rejected a plea offer and obtained a better 
disposition). 
210. Id. at 175. 
211. Id. at 265. 
212. Id. at 128; cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1973) (holding that the government bears the 
burden of proving a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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defendants provide evidence of actual innocence and other potentially meritori-
ous claims, prosecutors routinely refuse to dismiss cases, insisting on imposing 
some sort of mark and burden.
213
 In one example, a defendant was charged with 
fare evasion for using a special MetroCard for people with disabilities. He 
brought in a letter from his employer, a social-services agency, explaining that 
part of his job was to help people with disabilities take subway trips and that he 
had the card for that legitimate purpose. He explained that at the time, he was 
helping a large group of disabled persons navigate the subway and that he had 
swiped his regular card along with their special cards. Nevertheless, because he 
could not prove that he had not swiped the wrong card, the prosecutor refused 
to dismiss the case and offered an ACD instead.
214
 Similarly, prosecutors refused 
to dismiss the case against a defendant who was found with an oxycodone pill 
in his pocket, even though he produced his valid prescription for the medication. 
He was offered an ACD.
215
 Convicting the innocent is widely accepted. As one 
public defender explained bluntly to her client, “Dis con is what they offer inno-
cent people with records.”
216
 
This prosecutorial tenacity is a deep feature of the legal system’s response to 
broken-windows policing. New York prosecutors could have reacted to the on-
slaught of low-level arrests beginning in the 1990s in a variety of ways. They 
could, for example, have treated them as expressions of contestable policing pri-
orities rather than individual criminality warranting prosecution, and in so do-
ing, increased their initial declination rates.
217
 Indeed, prosecutors in two bor-
oughs recently did just that, at least with respect to certain offenses. In 2012, the 
Bronx District Attorney’s Office was confronted with a civil rights lawsuit and 
evidence that police were gratuitously arresting people in public housing for 
trespassing. The district attorney instituted an office policy against proceeding 
with trespassing prosecutions based solely on police reports.
218
 Likewise, in 
 
213. Judges are also reluctant to dismiss cases. One judge “said that he rarely grants a defense mo-
tion [to dismiss] on the basis of factual claims, because ‘there’s always two sides to the story,’ 
nor on the basis of legal claims, because he does not have time to adequately research the law 
in the middle of a typical shift.” KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 109. 
214. Id. at 127-28. 
215. Id. at 128-29. The public defender described arguing “for an hour” until the judge decided to 
dismiss the case. Id. 
216. Id. at 166. 
217. See Bowers, supra note 128, at 1712-20 (discussing differentials in declination rates). 
218. See Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/nyregion/in-the-bronx-resistance-to 
-prosecuting-stop-and-frisk-arrests.html [https://perma.cc/2F4Q-FBTW]. 
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2014, the Brooklyn District Attorney rolled back marijuana-possession prosecu-
tions, both because of the racial disparities in arrest rates and the notion that 
prosecution was overkill in such cases.
219
 In a similar vein, Baltimore has expe-
rienced many of the same challenges of racialized overpolicing as New York. 
There, police supervisors and prosecutors decline to prosecute 16% of all arrests 
at the jail before defense counsel is even appointed, and up to 25% of arrests for 
certain order-maintenance offenses.
220
 By contrast, New York’s general prosecu-
torial declination rates during the broken window era across all five boroughs 
remained between 7 and 12%.
221
 
Misdemeanorland implies that conviction rates should have stayed constant 
in the face of broken-windows’ expansive policing. “In many ways,” writes 
Kohler-Hausmann, “the New York City Broken Windows experiment embar-
rasses our traditional understanding of how an expansion of criminal enforce-
ment should work: as misdemeanor arrests climbed dramatically . . . the rate of 
criminal convictions fell sharply.”
222
 But that “traditional understanding” is only 
embarrassed if it assumes that prosecutors’ charging decisions move in lockstep 
with police arrest decisions, and that New York prosecutors should have treated 
the new flood of arrests as meritorious even though arrests were being made for 
new and problematic reasons. That need not have been true. Prosecutors might 
have decided, as the Bronx and Brooklyn District Attorneys eventually did in a 
limited fashion, that many cases did not deserve to proceed at all. That determi-
nation would have manifested in higher initial declination rates, early dismissals 
made not under pressure from defense counsel, but made sua sponte by pros-
ecutors on the merits. The fact that New York prosecutors generally maintain 
low initial declination rates and generally resist dismissal is revealing. It makes 
them complicit in broken-windows policing, not merely reactive to it. 
 
219. See Stephanie Clifford & Joseph Goldstein, Brooklyn Prosecutor Limits When He’ll Target Mari-
juana, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/nyregion/brooklyn
-district-attorney-to-stop-prosecuting-low-level-marijuana-cases.html [https://perma.cc
/RSH6-GAN8]. 
220. See Civil Rights Div., supra note 62, at 26, 35. 
221. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 146. Kohler-Hausmann clarifies in a note that “some 
arrests are discarded at the precinct,” and that these are not included in that seven to twelve 
percent declination rate. The overall prearraignment declination rate might therefore effec-
tively be higher. Id. at 146 n.8; see also New York County 2013-2017 Dispositions of Adult Arrests, 
N.Y. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES 5 (Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov 
/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/newyork.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7NZ-MHWU] (listing misde-
meanor declination rates between two and four percent from 2013 to 2017). 
222. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 67. 
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C. The New York Adversarial System at Work 
This dual phenomenon—a vigorous defense bar and strong prosecutorial an-
tipathy toward dismissal—suggests that Misdemeanorland could have told a dif-
ferent, more adjudicative story about the New York court system’s managerial 
compromise. As an empirical matter, the flood of broken-windows cases led to 
“a decline in the rate of criminal conviction and an increase in the rate of dismis-
sal,”
223
 dismissals that largely took the form of ACDs. Those convictions, in turn, 
were heavily weighted towards dis cons rather than letter crimes. The book de-
scribes this, at least in part, as a normative prosecutorial decision regarding de-
sert. “The practice of offering conditional dismissals [ACDs] in so many 
cases . . . illustrates a sentiment that it is morally unnecessary for the heavy ma-
chinery of criminal justice to come down on every defendant accused of a low-
level offense if the person can prove himself to be responsible and governa-
ble.”
224
 Dis cons, which are usually accompanied by conditions, impose a “less 
serious mark” and do not impose the same collateral consequences as letter con-
victions do.
225
 In these descriptions, the decline in conviction rates and the in-
crease in ACDs represent equitable prosecutorial decisions about the appropriate 
state response to low-level offending. Managerial justice embodies a “substan-
tive principle of proportionality, which is that people do not necessarily deserve 
to be punished for every incident of low-level offending.”
226
 
But a different way to make sense of the decline in conviction rates and the 
heavy use of dis cons is adversarial—that the existence of an aggressive defense 
bar meant that prosecutors could not simply convert all those new arrests into 
letter convictions. Instead, they had to compromise in the face of a meaningful 
defense presence. Managerial justice was, so to speak, imposed on them. From 
the defense perspective, “[t]he right to insist on a trial is converted into a tool to 
force prosecutors and judges to make more reasonable offers,” a classic feature 
of the adversarial plea-bargaining process.
227
 Force is necessary because pros-
 
223. Id. at 20. 
224. Id. at 74; see also id. at 266 (“The moral principle at work in the managerial model [is] that we 
essentially don’t seek any punishment at all unless the person demonstrates a persistent dis-
regard for social rules and otherwise seems unmoored from other institutions of social con-
trol . . . .”). 
225. Id. at 84-85. 
226. Id. at 73. 
227. Id. at 123; see also Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor 
to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1141-46 (2011) (describing how defense lawyer-
ing drives the plea-bargaining market and therefore the fairness of guilty pleas); cf. Albert W. 
Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB. L. REV. 919, 919-22 (2015) 
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ecutors demonstrate time and again that they are unwilling to dismiss cases out-
right, even where the evidence is weak or even where it indicates actual inno-
cence. Instead, under pressure from defense counsel, they offer compromise dis-
positions. The ACD and the dis con are central to the New York landscape not 
because they are an equitable gift from prosecutors to defendants—products of 
a kinder, gentler managerial mindset—but because they are an adversarial com-
promise. They work because they let prosecutors save face, because they opera-
tionalize the presumptive need to ratify arrests in some way, and because they 
alter the defense calculus. They are dispositions that defendants will often ra-
tionally accept even when they have a skilled defender willing to litigate and even 
when they might have meritorious legal issues and viable defenses.
228
 
For example, New York is home to the Bronx Defenders,
229
 one of the prem-
ier public-defense organizations in the country. Between 2011 and 2012, the office 
identified fifty-four marijuana misdemeanor cases—what they called “fighter” 
cases—in which clients with potentially meritorious issues wanted to fight their 
charges.
230
 The fighters were represented by lawyers at the Bronx Defenders and 
by attorneys at the Manhattan law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton. But 
few fighters actually managed to contest their cases, and in the end the majority 
accepted ACDs or pled guilty, mostly to disorderly conduct. Prosecutors took 
advantage of court delays, postponements, and the requirement that defendants 
be physically present at every court date to pressure defendants to plead. Thirty 
percent of the fighter cases were eventually dismissed—twice the average 
rate
231





(describing how prosecutorial bargaining tactics can lead to wrongful conviction); William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2558 
(2004) (discussing the relatively constrained negotiating powers of defense counsel). 
228. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 131 (describing the “difficulty [for defense counsel] 
in trying to convince clients to reject arraignment guilty pleas”). 
229. BRONX DEFENDERS, https://www.bronxdefenders.org [https://perma.cc/W266-K23Y]; see 
also James Anderson et al., The Effects of Holistic Defense on Criminal Justice Outcomes, 132 HARV. 
L. REV. 819, 823 (2019) (describing the holistic-defense model deployed by Bronx Defenders 
as saving its clients over one million days in jail over a ten-year period). 
230. No Day in Court: Marijuana Possession Cases and the Failure of the Bronx Criminal Courts, BRONX 
DEFENDERS 2 (May 2013), https://www.bronxdefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05
/No-Day-in-Court-A-Report-by-The-Bronx-Defenders-May-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc
/WRU4-PMP4]. 
231. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 150 (noting an “other dismissal” rate of twelve to fifteen 
percent). 
232. BRONX DEFENDERS, supra note 230, at 3. 
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The lesson from the fighter cases is how stubbornly New York prosecutors 
resist dismissal and adjudication on the merits and the correlative importance of 
a zealous defense. Even with some of the best lawyers in town, the majority of 
defendants with colorable issues still ended up with ACDs and dis cons, often 
after months of litigation. Without those lawyers, it stands to reason that there 
would have been fewer dismissals and more defendants would have accepted 
worse dispositions. 
The pressure that defense counsel exert on prosecutors is a classic feature of 
the adjudicative system—the beating heart of the adversarial process. That is 
why the Supreme Court treats the right to counsel as the primary guarantee “that 
all other rights of the accused are protected.”
233
 Evidence does not speak for it-
self, and due process is not self-enforcing; the adjudicative model depends on 
defense counsel to operationalize its commitment to rights, due process, and ev-
idence.
234
 Of course, defense counsel’s role is not only adjudicative. They per-
form many functions, often operating as de facto social workers on behalf of their 
clients, and in that sense could be said to be doing managerial work as well.
235
 
But at least in New York, the defense bar clearly operates in traditionally adver-
sarial ways in line with the adjudicative model. 
This suggests that adjudicative forces, not just managerialism, are driving 
some of the reduction in conviction rates. Evidence and guilt are indeed devalued 
in many ways throughout the misdemeanor process, but that does not mean that 
the adjudicative model lacks relevance. Instead, the classic adversarial procedures 
of adjudication in New York appear to be producing compromised dispositions 
that punt on evidentiary questions of guilt, not because the system has given up 
on guilt and conviction, but because a robust defense bar makes it hard to deter-
mine guilt every time. Without that defense bar, the process would be more con-
ventionally punitive. These dynamics suggest that managerial justice has not re-
placed the adjudicative model but may even be a result of it. 
The influence of the defense bar in New York offers crucial insights for the 
rest of the misdemeanor universe, where counsel is so often lacking. Misdemean-
orland shows, step-by-step and negotiation-by-negotiation, how a robust com-
mitment to the constitutional entitlement to counsel can profoundly alter the 
culture of lower courts and lead to reduced punishment and fewer formal con-
victions. In New York, the stakes were ratcheted up by the advent of broken-
 
233. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988). 
234. See Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, supra note 13, at 1057-66 (describing the outsized role that 
defense counsel plays in legitimating the adjudicatory system). 
235. See Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants, supra note 13, at 445-48, 459-62 (describing how the public-
defense function often morphs into social work). 
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windows policing, but the salutary effects of strong defense counsel would per-
tain in the many jurisdictions grappling with heavy caseloads, limited resources, 
and prosecutorial reluctance to screen and dismiss.
236
 At a certain level of gener-
ality, the proposition sounds obvious—scholars and the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers have been vocally arguing for a decade that the mis-
demeanor system needs better defense resources.
237
 But Misdemeanorland care-
fully charts the informal, institutional dynamics through which the presence of 
a robust, active defense bar can change the very tenor of prosecutorial and judi-
cial decision-making, shifting official intuitions about foundational questions of 
what constitutes a fair and just outcome. 
v. misdemeanor justice? 
The sprawling misdemeanor drama in New York and around the country 
offers a poignant reminder of the democracy- and equality-reinforcing aspira-
tions of the rule of law. Demands for due process, evidence, and legal accounta-
bility are some of the core traditional ways in which we render criminal law de-
fensible—bases on which it becomes permissible for the state to exercise its 
coercive criminal authority and to punish.
238
 Such rules also have equity-protec-
tive features. The requirement that convictions rest on evidence instantiates the 
idea that people should only be punished for their criminal conduct—not for 
their race, class, or disfavored social status. Constraints on police and prosecu-
 
236. While there is scant research on prosecutorial decision-making, what little is available sug-
gests that misdemeanor prosecutors often operate under external and internal pressures to 
convert arrests into charges and then into convictions in ways that overstate defendant crim-
inal liability. Misdemeanor dockets are usually staffed by the newest prosecutors, just as they 
are typically staffed by junior public defenders. Bruce Frederick & Don Stemen, The Anatomy 
of Discretion: An Analysis of Prosecutorial Decision Making—Technical Report, NAT’L INST. JUST. 
134-35 (Dec. 2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240334.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z5ZF-AVDH]. New prosecutors are often more deferential to police; one prosecu-
tor explained that she “didn’t have the words” to challenge police decisions when she first 
started. Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1065, 1099-1113, 1101 n.190 (2014). 
237. See, e.g., Boruchowitz et al., supra note 48; Roberts, supra note 102. 
238. See Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 
313 (2004) (describing the traditional view that due process promotes the democratic legiti-
macy of criminal punishment for innocent and guilty alike). This is not the only possible view. 
See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 790 n.125 
(1994) (“The deep logic of the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights is not to 
protect truly guilty defendants—especially those who have committed violent crimes—from 
conviction, but primarily to protect truly innocent defendants from erroneous conviction.”). 
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torial discretion are, in part, antidiscrimination measures: they restrict the un-
fettered operation of bias and require that arrests and prosecutions be made for 
legally legitimate reasons.
239
 The right to counsel represents a constitutional ef-
fort to level the playing field between rich and poor, to ensure that the disadvan-
taged benefit from the system’s protective rules.
240
 Such rules help promote ac-
curacy,
241
 but they also operationalize other democratic commitments such as 
transparency, official accountability, and the preservation of individual liberty 
and dignity—protections most needed by, and most often withheld from, the 
vulnerable. Accordingly, we can think of the adjudicative model, with its rule-
of-law commitments, as a central democratic vehicle through which criminal ju-




To be sure, such noble-sounding protections are often more aspirational than 
real, and even when observed they are often inadequate to guarantee either 
equality or fairness. The legality principle nulla poena sine lege (no punishment 
without law) and its adjudicative infrastructure mask and validate many injus-
tices, including racially disparate enforcement practices and overly punitive sen-
tences.
243
 U.S. criminal procedure is infamously underprotective of people of 
 
239. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that equal protection guar-
antees protect against racially discriminatory law enforcement); Papachristou v. City of Jack-
sonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (striking down a vagrancy statute in part because it conferred 
excessively unfettered discretion on police to discriminate); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
366 (1886) (striking down city ordinances because they conferred “naked and arbitrary 
power” upon decision makers which was used to single out Chinese businesses). 
240. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2306 (2013) (discussing the 
historic understanding of Gideon as a class and racial equalizer). 
241. Misdemeanorland treats the adjudicative model as concerned primarily with accuracy. See 
KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 71 (“[T]he animating task organizing the work of crim-
inal justice actors [under the adjudicative model] is to determine whether the defendant in 
fact committed the criminal act of which she is accused.”). The book thus does not focus on 
adjudication’s other legitimating functions: “It is not self-evident, at least to me, that what 
we want from misdemeanor courts is perfect adjudicative accuracy.” Id. at 264; see also id. 
(“[C]ourt actors operating under the managerial model produce both false positives and false 
negatives . . . .”). 
242. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (limiting state authority to criminalize same-
sex adult intimate conduct); Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156. 
243. Jonathan Simon, The Second Coming of Dignity, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, 
supra note 13, at 275, 275-76; see also Monica C. Bell, Response, Hidden Laws of the Time of 
Ferguson, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 19-20 (2018) (distinguishing between legal legitimacy and 
sociological legitimacy); Jeffrey Fagan, Dignity Is the New Legitimacy, in THE NEW CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 13, at 308, 313 (“[I]ndignities are not easily managed by either 
a reinvigorated legality principle or by a procedure-based regulatory apparatus that responds 
formally to dignity incursions.”). 
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color, allowing racial biases and power inequalities to infect stops, arrests, and 
the obtaining of consent.
244
 By its nature, the rule of law is no protection against 
laws that affirmatively permit or promote discrimination.
245
 But while insuffi-
cient on their own, legal constraints remain pillars of the broader criminal justice 
equality project. This Part explores the close relationship between legal rules and 
social equality, and the inegalitarian consequences of a misdemeanor culture that 
devalues both. It then examines New York’s managerialism, with its concomi-
tant disdain for adjudicative values and presumptive demand for social control 
over the disadvantaged. It concludes that the managerial turn away from due 
process, evidence, and guilt is intimately linked to classist and racist presump-
tions driving managerial practices. 
A. The Equitable Importance of the Rule of Law 
The erosion of core legal protections in the U.S. misdemeanor arena—what 
Misdemeanorland describes in New York as an abdication of the adjudicative 
model—has special inequitable implications, both procedural and substantive. 
As described above, many jurisdictions across the country routinely disregard 
adjudicative norms, factual innocence, and the right to counsel.
246
 Speedy dock-
ets devalue law and evidence; judicial review is rare because motions and appeals 
are rarely filed. These dynamics weaken due process commitments, and they do 
so in ways that erode the fault model itself—society’s commitment to convicting 
only the guilty.
247
 To the extent that the system does not bother to follow basic 
rules or check the evidence, it announces its agnosticism about whether defend-
ants are actually culpable. 
Such erosions call into question some of the basic justifications for the exer-
cise of state criminal authority in the first instance. Ignoring defendant fault is, 
of course, a major deviation from what we typically understand to be the core 
 
244. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that pretext and racial bias do 
not invalidate stops and arrests as long as police have probable cause); Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (discounting the effect of police pressure on black males in obtaining 
consent to search). See generally Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Crimi-
nal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543 (2011) (describing myriad ways in which criminal proce-
dure permits racial and other forms of discrimination). 
245. See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 
2194-95 (2013) (criticizing Gideon in particular and rights discourse more generally for vali-
dating an inherently unfair system of criminal laws). 
246. See supra Part I. 
247. See supra notes 59-60 (describing the centrality of the fault model). 
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project of criminal law.
248
 And even where defendants are guilty, the underlying 
conduct at issue in misdemeanors is typically not particularly dangerous or cul-
pable. These are largely low-level harms and disorder offenses, crimes that only 
weakly justify state coercion in the first place.
249
 Nevertheless, arrests and pros-
ecutions for that minor conduct impose significant burdens and intrusions. Mil-
lions of people every year lose their time, money, liberty, jobs, housing, credit, 
and immigration status. They are being marked, tracked, disrespected, and stig-
matized. At these sites where criminal conduct is not particularly weighty, and 
yet punishment is significant, crime-control justifications are at their weakest 
while liberty and proportionality concerns are especially strong. 
At the same time, this compromised legal process is aimed largely at the poor, 
people of color, the vulnerable, and the dispossessed. Their subordinate status 
invites attention from the misdemeanor machinery, and that machinery in turn 
generates and exacerbates their subordination. Defendants are often selected and 
convicted based on wealth, race, neighborhood, and social characteristics other 
than (or in addition to) their individual criminal behavior.
250
 Through this self-
reinforcing cycle, the politically vulnerable are overexposed to a criminal process 
that disregards basic rule-of-law constraints while affirmatively generating so-
cial disadvantage. We might say that the disadvantaged receive a lower quality 
version of the rule of law, in the same way that they receive lower-quality public 
education, housing, and health care. The system provides one weakened set of 
legal commitments for them and another, more robust set for those who have 
the social capital to insist on greater legal protection. The consequences of this 
state of affairs are far-reaching: those thirteen million annual misdemeanor cases 
are the vehicles through which most Americans experience the criminal justice 
system. In this way, weak rule of law becomes a defining and contributing fea-
ture of social disadvantage throughout the United States. 
These dynamics also illuminate the crucial relationship between policing and 
legal process. The more policing veers towards the bare exercise of discrimina-
tory social control, the more important the subsequent legal process becomes. 
 
248. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 1985) (stating that “[t]he 
general purposes of the [MPC] are . . . to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and 
inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individuals or public interests”); LARRY 
ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 263-87 (2009) (proposing a culpability-based criminal code); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 (1958) (identifying community 
condemnation as key to legitimate criminalization). 
249. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 365-73 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(describing the thin state justifications for making arrests in fine-only cases). 
250. I discuss this phenomenon in greater depth in The Penal Pyramid, supra note 13. 
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Legal actors—prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys—have the power and 
opportunity to moderate, modify, or resist decisions made by a less-regulated 
police authority. This is in essence what the Bronx and Brooklyn District Attor-
neys did when they systematically declined to prosecute trespass and marijuana 
arrests.
251
 The potentially salutary effects of such decisions, and a robust legal 
apparatus generally, are especially important in the face of inegalitarian policing 
practices such as broken windows. 
Conversely, these legal checks and balances are integral to the Supreme 
Court’s decision to leave policing itself relatively underregulated. Because of the 
diverse and hard-to-control nature of policing, criminal procedure relies heavily 
on the more formal postarrest legal apparatus to ensure legitimate postpolicing 
criminal outcomes. As the Court cautioned in Terry v. Ohio, “[W]e [must be] 
mindful of the limitations of the judicial function in controlling the myriad daily 
situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the street.”
252
 
That judicial function is better suited to regulate legal processes, which check 
policing excesses indirectly. As Darryl Brown put it, “Strong regulation of adju-
dication permits weak rule-based investigative regulation because, as the Su-
preme Court repeatedly implies in its criminal procedure decisions, we believe 
that adjudication checks investigation.”
253
 This means that erosions of rule-of-
law norms in misdemeanor legal processing are especially worrisome because 
that system is the infrastructure responsible for managing some of the most 
problematic forms of policing. Homicide arrest practices have many flaws, but 
today we rarely worry that they are mere pretexts for discriminatory social and 
racial control.
254
 But as many scholars have pointed out, quality-of-life arrests 
are only weakly tied to crime control even as they are suffused with race- and 
wealth-based biases.
255
 Many of them are made without probable cause.
256
 Mis-
demeanor arrests thus demand special skepticism and scrutiny from legal actors. 
 
251. See supra notes 218-219 and accompanying text; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Opinion, When 
the Police Become Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12
/26/opinion/police-prosecutors-misdemeanors.html [https://perma.cc/KB6X-A3KM] (de-
scribing the informal transfer of misdemeanor prosecutorial authority to police). 
252. 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). 
253. Brown, supra note 185, at 1588-89 (citation omitted). 
254. See generally JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA (2015) (docu-
menting homicide underenforcement in low-income African American neighborhoods in Los 
Angeles). By contrast, drug offenses, both serious and minor, are often decried as pretextual 
and racially motivated. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION 
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 64-84 (2012). 
255. See HARCOURT, supra note 73, at 7; Fagan & Davies, supra note 73. 
256. See Natapoff, supra note 12, at 117-18. 
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Put differently, a strong demarcating line between policing and prosecution 
protects individual liberty and the integrity of the legal process in ways that are 
democratically crucial. For the individual facing the state, that line marks the 
boundary between being an arrestee and a defendant, between being hassled by 
police and potentially sustaining a life-long criminal conviction.
257
 Constitution-
ally speaking, the move from policing to prosecution represents the initiation of 
the adversarial process itself, triggering the right to counsel, due process, and 
many other dignitary protections.
258
 When prosecutors and judges relax their 
vigilance around that line—for example, by failing to engage in robust screening 
and legal scrutiny of police decisions—they weaken basic institutional protec-
tions against the stratifying police state. From this perspective, misdemeanor 
docket management is not merely about clearing cases; it is a normative legal 
project of the highest order. 
B. Managerial Injustices 
In New York, the machinations of the misdemeanor process have been dem-
ocratically volatile for over a decade, as the system’s racial and class inequalities 
have triggered scrutiny and anger. In 2012, U.S. District Judge Scheindlin con-
cluded that police practices associated with broken windows were intentionally 
racially discriminatory and violated the Equal Protection Clause.
259
 That same 
year, thousands of New Yorkers marched silently down Fifth Avenue to protest 
stop and frisk.
260
 The outrage of the Black Lives Matter movement was stoked 
in 2014 when a police officer killed Eric Garner while arresting him for the ex-
traordinarily minor offense of selling loose cigarettes.
261
 In 2017, Politico reported 
that white New Yorkers receive more lenient sentences for marijuana possession 
 
257. Of course, the mere fact of arrest can be punitive and threatening in myriad ways beyond 
hassle. See Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 953-
57 (2002) (describing how being stopped by police constitutes a form of disciplining and ra-
cial formation for black people). 
258. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (discussing attachment of the right 
to counsel at critical stages); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
259. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
260. John Leland & Colin Moynihan, Thousands March Silently to Protest Stop-and-Frisk Policies, 
N.Y. TIMES, (June 17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/nyregion/thousands 
-march-silently-to-protest-stop-and-frisk-policies.html [https://perma.cc/X5AG-G6L5]. 
261. I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1248 (2017) (empha-
sizing the Black Lives Matter movement’s anger over police violence against people of color 
who, like Eric Garner, are accused of minor crimes). 
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than African Americans and Latinos do.
262
 The New York Police Department is 
currently being sued to release data regarding its arrests for turnstile jumping in 




The procedural dysfunctions of the misdemeanor system have also triggered 
public resistance. Court watchers now sit in lower courts and report their activ-
ities.
264
 Community bail funds in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx have put up 
the money to release thousands of low-level defendants, effectively countering 
judicial decisions that would have resulted in detention.
265
 The Bronx Criminal 
Court entered into a settlement in 2018 after the Bronx Defenders sued it for 
delays in its misdemeanor dockets.
266
 And the political machinery has responded 
at the highest levels. When Mayor Bill de Blasio was first elected in 2013, one of 
his campaign promises was to curtail oppressive misdemeanor-policing prac-
tices. In 2017, his administration rolled out substantial reforms of the sum-
monses system.
267
 In all these ways, the New York debate understands low-level 
criminal institutions as highly contested sites of race, poverty, and democratic 
accountability. 
 
262. Brendan Cheney, For Non-White New Yorkers, Marijuana Arrests More Often Lead to Conviction, 
POLITICO (May 9, 2017, 5:06 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall
/story/2017/05/04/racial-disparities-in-marijuana-convictions-in-all-five-boroughs-111807 
[https://perma.cc/XM83-JR7L]. 
263. Ali Winston, What’s at Stake in Fight for Subway Fare-Beating Data, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/nyregion/hopping-subway-turnstiles-data
.html [https://perma.cc/5L7W-ARU9]. 
264. See, e.g., About Court Watch NYC, CT. WATCH NYC, https://www.courtwatchnyc.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/GA67-A8EJ]; see also Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a 
Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2183 & n.40 (2014) (describing court-watch pro-
grams and listing sources). 
265. See, e.g., Simonson supra note 12, at 600-02 (listing and describing the success of bail funds 
in getting individuals released); Our Results, BROOK. COMMUNITY BAIL FUND (2016), https://
brooklynbailfund.org/our-results-1 [https://perma.cc/US6C-MKEW] (discussing the or-
ganization’s role in keeping over 3,500 individuals out of jail). 
266. Ali Winston, Speedy Trials Return to a Bronx Court Known for Delays and Dysfunction, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/nyregion/bronx 
-misdemeanor-backlog-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/JHS6-8HD7]. 
267. Jim Dwyer, Vowing to Slay the (Already Subdued) Stop-and-Frisk Dragon, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/nyregion/de-blasio-and-bratton-promise-to 
-deliver-on-goals-but-give-no-credit.html [https://perma.cc/HPV3-UVQ3]; J. David Good-
man, Fewer Criminal Tickets for Petty Crimes, Like Public Urination, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/nyregion/criminal-summons-civil-public-urination
.html [https://perma.cc/64RM-4RXH]. 
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Misdemeanorland begins and ends in a similarly critical register by lamenting 
the inequitable impact of misdemeanor enforcement on New York’s poor people 
of color and the “role [of the criminal system] in reproducing class and racial 
inequality in the United States.”
268
 The “tremendous” costs of policing fall dis-
proportionately on “people living in conditions of ‘social insecurity and margin-
ality.’”
269
 Kohler-Hausmann explains: 
The residents inside these communities are the ones who come to have 
criminal records . . . , endure the degradation of arrest and prosecution, 
lose days of work and child care, and face interminable demands . . . . 
They increasingly feel disrespected and oppressed by a police presence 




“Ultimately,” Kohler-Hausmann writes in conclusion, “this book points to moral 
commitments we hold about the dignity due to those in our social community 
who have been accused—or even convicted of—violating laws.”
271
 Acknowledg-
ing “the very real social problems that gave rise to and sustain commitment to 
the Broken Windows policing model,” she argues that “[t]hose issues cannot be 
remedied by legal reforms that target judicial practice. They can only be ad-
dressed by a larger transformative project.”
272
 
Misdemeanorland clearly identifies the social inequities and racial imbalances 
of the New York misdemeanor system. But it is less clear about whether mana-
gerial justice is to blame, and thus how managerialism should be normatively 
evaluated at the end of the day. “Is there anything wrong with what I have de-
scribed about misdemeanorland?” Kohler-Hausmann asks rhetorically.
273
 The 
book closes on a balanced note by observing that, on the one hand, 
[m]any readers may [be] deeply disturbed by the account of misdemean-
orland documented here, shocked that criminal courts charged with ad-
judicating guilt and innocence and protecting constitutional rights rarely 
 
268. KOHLER-HAUSSMANN, supra note 7 at 10-11 (“I conclude by arguing that [this] study . . . illu-
minates a set of urgent moral and political questions about the criminal justice system as an 
instrument of social control and its role in reproducing class and racial inequality in the United 
States.”). 
269. Id. at 267; see also id. at 266 (noting that arrests are “systematically biased by certain social 
facts, some of which raise fundamental concerns of racial and class inequities”). 
270. Id. at 267. 
271. Id. at 257. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 264. 
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do so, and disillusioned that these courts instead use the tools of criminal 




On the other hand, 
[o]thers might be heartened that New York City’s misdemeanor courts 
are working so well. Flooded with substantial volumes of subfelony cases 
without a concurrent increase in court resources, one could see the man-
agerial model as an efficient adaptation to the conditions generated by 
Broken Windows policing . . . . One might conclude that misdemeanor-
land court actors . . . innovated not only a brilliantly efficient response to 
accusations of low-level offending, but also an inherently just one . . . . 
[P]erhaps what we ought to do with minor crimes is not necessarily pun-




Kohler-Hausmann thinks both are “simultaneously true”: “I concur with both 
assessments in some respects,” she concludes.
276
 
In this regard, Misdemeanorland understates its own implicit critique of man-
agerial justice. The book sounds the alarm that “the operations of misdemean-
orland . . . function[] to either reproduce race and class inequality or manage the 
effects of class and racial inequality in a punitive fashion.”
277
 It points out that 
the “presumption of need for social control . . . arises from the social standing of 
the people subject to its power.”
278
 In effect, this is a claim that the presumption 
driving managerialism is inherently racist and classist, aimed as it is at “the entire 
category of people who are targeted by Broken Windows policing . . . namely, 
low-income men of color, [who] become a population with an ongoing burden 
to prove governability in lower criminal courts.”
279
 Put differently, managerial 
justice only happens to disadvantaged classes of people whom legal officials con-
sider to be the sorts of people who need to be managed. It is precisely because 




274. Id. at 256. 
275. Id. 
276. Id.; see also id. at 264 (“There is both an efficiency and fairness argument to be made for the 
managerial model . . . .”). 
277. Id. at 257. 
278. Id. at 224. 
279. Id. at 79. 
280. Id. at 228-29. 
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misdemeanor defendants are, and “that these populations are inherently disor-
derly and must affirmatively prove their fitness for freedom,”
281
 that marking, 
hassle, and performance seem like “reasonable” or “practical” policies.
282
 Pros-
ecutors and judges believe they already know what type of person a wealthy, 
white, employed defendant is: there is only uncertainty, and therefore the need 
for ongoing managerial control, in the face of class and racial disadvantage. 
Such biases are on display in the ways that the managerial model designates 
misdemeanor criminals in the first place. As Misdemeanorland documents, mis-
demeanor charges and convictions are remotely related, at best, to actual crimi-
nal, culpable conduct. It is the process itself that selects people based on crimi-
nalizing presumptions regarding poverty, race, and neighborhood, and then 
turns those people into recognizable, documented criminals based heavily on 
their court-related performances. Misdemeanorland actively creates and con-
structs its own subjects: “Defendants come to be the type of person who ought to 
be convicted by achieving a certain status in misdemeanorland, a status that is 
only to varying degrees achieved by establishing violations of specific provisions 
of the penal law.”
283
 People who emerge from misdemeanorland formally 
marked as criminals do so not because they are necessarily guilty or culpable, but 
because they are the types of people whom the process treats as criminal.
284
 
In these ways, Misdemeanorland shows how managerial social control, with 
its inattention to law, evidence, and guilt, embodies the demand that poor people 
of color constantly account for themselves. The demand is prior to any actual 
proof of criminality—a reversal made possible precisely by the erosion of the ad-
judicative model. It arises from presumptions about race, class, and neighbor-
hood, which are then operationalized and validated first through policing prac-
tices and then through the legal misdemeanor process.
285
 Because those initial 
police selection decisions are heavily biased, Kohler-Hausmann concludes that 
 
281. Id. at 224. 
282. Id. at 266 (explaining how it “seems . . . perfectly reasonable” for frontline actors to use the 
managerial approach); see supra text accompanying notes 79-83 (describing managerial justice 
as a practical response). 
283. Id. at 261. 
284. See id. at 263 (describing how a defendant named Frank “might well have been guilty . . . but 
it was his inability to perform properly . . . that led to his custodial arrest and the prosecutor’s 
insistence that he plead guilty”). 
285. In a similar vein, Khalil Gibran Muhammad points out that criminal justice data have histor-
ically been inherently racial and normative, even when they purport to be merely statistical. 
See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 4-5 (2011) (tracing the history of how “blackness was 
refashioned through crime statistics”); id. at 277 (“The choice about which narratives we at-
tach to [racialized criminal] data . . . is ours to make.”). 
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inequities would persist “even if the criminal courts impartially apply the mana-
gerial model to all defendants irrespective of class, race, or immigration sta-
tus.”
286
 But her own account indicates that the managerial model is not so im-
partial. There is no need for a managerial approach to the socially privileged 
because there is no uncertainty about their governability and thus no need for 
the assessment. The book thus reveals the managerial assessment itself to be bi-
ased, disrespectful, and punitive. 
Such insights about the normative skew of managerialism are illuminating 
for the entire misdemeanor debate. Disrespectful presumptions about the disad-
vantaged are a powerful force in the misdemeanor universe—they lie behind the 
many erosions of substantive law and constitutional rights, the wholesale con-
version of misdemeanor defendants into revenue sources in numerous jurisdic-
tions, and the general lack of respect for the rule of law that permeates low-level 
criminal processes. These phenomena reflect political and social powerlessness; 
the system would not tolerate such debased treatment of people with greater 
economic or social authority. They suggest that, going forward, the misde-
meanor system should be understood broadly and critically not only as a crimi-
nal justice institution, but as an engine of social and political inequality.
287
 
conclusion: the leniency fallacy  
As the United States grapples with the punitive brutality of decades of mass 
incarceration,
288
 it is tempting to view misdemeanors as lenient alternatives to 
felony punishment. But Misdemeanorland offers persuasive evidence that misde-
meanor justice in general, and managerial justice in particular, is not lenient. It 
may not result in formal jail sentences or criminal convictions as often as it 
might, but it embodies a profoundly suspicious, disrespectful, punitive stance 
towards its disadvantaged subjects. Because many of the burdens associated with 
the misdemeanor experience do not count doctrinally as “punishment,” they 
have escaped the kinds of legal constraints and scholarly scrutiny accorded in-
carceration and other formal sentencing measures. But the misdemeanor-pun-
ishment problem cannot be solved through formalism. To be sure, the Supreme 
 
286. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 266. 
287. See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 11-12 (“Like low-quality public schools and segregated housing, 
misdemeanors are an integral part of the downward social cycle that creates and perpetuates 
inequality.”). 
288. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 7, at 1, 5 (contrasting mass incarceration with the work of 
low level courts). 
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Court often thinks it can.
289
 But crushing debt, job loss, and housing displace-
ment are degrading, burdensome, and stratifying even though they are regarded 
as civil in nature. As Misdemeanorland demonstrates, marking, procedural hassle, 
and performance requirements are functionally punitive even though they do 
not always legally constitute punishment. Fully appreciated, the burdens of a 
misdemeanor encounter, including its managerial aspects, represent a heavy-
handed exercise of the punitive, coercive power of the state.
290
 This is especially 
true where that assertion of state power so openly produces and exacerbates so-
cial inequality along democratically suspect lines of wealth and race—stratifica-
tion is part and parcel of the punitive exercise.
291
 
As have many American jurisdictions, New York invested an enormous 
amount of time, resources, and money into expanding the net of criminalization 
through which to exert control over the poor, especially poor residents of color. 
Turbocharged by broken-windows policing, these policies and practices ex-
tended the potential reach of the criminal process deep into the lives and com-
munities of African Americans and Latinos. In response, prosecutors and judges 
accommodated and compromised with the basic social-control premise. It 
would be a mistake to draw from Misdemeanorland the normative conclusion that 
this accommodation was lenient simply because the system could have incarcer-
ated and convicted at higher rates. When the state intentionally creates the over-
criminalizing conditions under which it could punish many more people more 
harshly, it should not get credit for being lenient merely because it does not take 
full advantage. 
The leniency fallacy infects much of the petty-offense discourse and culture. 
It probably accounts for much of the relative invisibility of misdemeanors within 
 
289. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 442-46 (2011) (authorizing incarceration for civil 
contempt without the appointment of counsel); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 
354-55 (2001) (describing the invasiveness and humiliations of a “normal custodial arrest” for 
even a minor criminal offense as permissible burdens even where such an offense could not 
lead to incarceration as a formal punishment); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 
(1987) (noting that pretrial detention is a regulatory, not punitive, measure); cf. Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-66 (2010) (extending Sixth Amendment effectiveness-of-counsel 
scrutiny to defense counsel’s advice regarding deportation notwithstanding deportation’s civil 
nature). 
290. Sharon Dolovich and I have argued elsewhere for this expansive functional approach to pun-
ishment. See Dolovich & Natapoff, Introduction to THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, su-
pra note 13, at 1, 3 (arguing that the criminal process cannot be understood without a full 
evaluation of “the actual human experience of the millions of people who are selected, labeled, 
managed, and punished as ‘criminals’”). 
291. See, e.g., WACQUANT, supra note 27, at 42-44 (arguing that a central purpose of criminal pun-
ishment is to label and manage the dispossessed). 
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the great debates over the excesses of American criminalization. And some of that 
is fair enough. The average felony sentence in the United States is four years in 
prison, an objectively heavier and more painful experience than the typical mis-
demeanor sentence of probation and a fine.
292
 Multidecade drug sentences, 
prison overcrowding, and solitary confinement do indeed make misdemeanor 
punishments look petty by comparison. But mass incarceration has numbed us 
to the heavy-handedness of the misdemeanor experience and the intrusiveness 
of managerialism. Millions of people nationwide are losing their liberty, money, 
time, credit, jobs, housing, dignity, and self-esteem. Among its many contribu-
tions, Misdemeanorland shows just how deeply punitive this massive misde-
meanor apparatus has become. 
 
292. See Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 
2009 - Statistical Tables, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 26 (Dec. 2013) https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub
/pdf/fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS6D-C5BH] (noting that, in 2009, the mean felony 
prison sentence was fifty-two months). 
